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INTRODUCTION 
Although it is true that almost everrone with a high-school 
course in Latin to his credit, has been initiated into the intri-
cacies ot continuous Latin prose with Caesar's Commentaries ~ the 
Gallic Wars, there are probably very few of these who ever regard-
'. edthat work as lIore than a training-ground for recruit grammari-
ans. Yet no better proof may be had of the literary signlficance 
of thls work of Caesar than an examlnatlon of a chronologlcal 
chart ot Roman efforts in the field of poetlc and prose composi-
tlon. Such a chart shows that by the middle ot the first centur, 
B.C., Rome had awakened to its responslbllltles as a world-center 
of culture as well as of emplre,)aad had already made signlticant, 
and not completely unorlglnal, attempts at ··lm1tation of the Greeks 
in lIost of the literary forms. Llvlus Andronlcus and N8evius,'-' 
PI aut us and Terence had proved that the Roman could not only ap-
preclate the humor of the Greek New Comedy but cOuld also produce 
its own literary mirth-makers. In lts lIore serlous aoments Rome' 
had taken a glimpse at the world ot trageQy through the eyes of 
Accius and Pacuvius. In hls Annales, a century and a half betore, 
.-
Ennius had lnaugurated the Latln hexameter. Lucillus, golng 
further, had created a new llterary form, the satlre whlch the 
Romans could always clalm as thelr own. A promise of what a 
greater genlus could do wlth the rather unwieldy Latin language 
2 
.' was glven br Lucretius when he explalned the causes of thlngs ln 
hls great dldactlc poem, De Rerum Natura. Catullus notwlthstandl~ 
a rather ungraclous sllenoe on the part of Horace, had ln hls shor1 
llfe displayed a remarkable and hardlf equalled ablllt1 to master 
the wonderful11 varled Greek meters, and reproduce them in hls 
own language. Twenty years previous, ln 70 B.C., Crassus and An-
tonlus had yielded their places of honer as the foremost Roman 
orators, to the ardent prosecutor of Verres. In one tield alone 
dld Rome lag tar behind, as Clcero himselt admits,l and as the 
chronologlcal chart wl11 readily shaw, in the fleld of history. 
For lt is a polnt of debate, whether Thucydldes or Polybius were 
ever surpassed by any of the Roman historians, lt is certalnly 
beyond dlspute that before the time of Caesar and Sallust, nothlng 
even worthy of belng put ln the same class wlth their work had as 
yet appeared. 
It ls then this more lmportant aspect of the Gal11c !!£! •• 
a llterary slgnlficance undreamed ot b1 the hlgh-school boy who ls 
struggling for the first time wlth lndlrect dlscourse, undreamed 
of, too, by many of our high-school teachers--that will tora the 
subject of thls thesls. Presclndlng tor the moment trom t~e po-
litlcal slgnlflcance of the Commentarles, a polnt which wl1l 
, 
1 Clcero, Brutgs, 228, ed. and transl. by G.L. Hendr1ckson, Ca.-
bridge, Harvard University Press, 1942. Also, De Leglbus, I, 5, 
ed. and transl. by Clinton W. Keyes, Putnam's, Ne. York, 1928. 
.,' 
always be a matter ot dlspute, let us attempt to answer a que.tlon 
whlch ma7, perhaps be settled wlth more certalnty~ Can lt be sald 
that wlth the appearance ot the Commentarles, Latln llterature 
detlnlte17 stepped lnto a new tleld~e.ireplaclng the groplng steps 
ot an Antlpater or a Slsenna with the contldent and more mature 
strldes to be tollowed so successtully by Sallust, Llvy, Tacitus 
•• and Suetonius? Can the Gall!2 Wars claim the title ot being the 
tlrst Roman literary Hlstory. That ls the question ot th1s thesls 
But since it ls evldent that some norm els required tor de-
cidlng an lssue whlch mlght well be settled b7 many equally pro-
bable lubject1ve interpretations, the question may be stated more 
specitically in the tollow1ng words: Do the Gallic War. meet the 
requirements ot good h1atorical composition as thoae requirement. 
were enuaerated by Oicero, with whom, according to J. Wlght DeUS-t, 
-Latln literary crltlc1sm may be said to have lts real beglnningf 2 
He waa, at any rate, a crltlc who tully realized the lnadequaoy ot 
Roman attempta ln the t1eld ot history up to hls own tlme. But I 
would he admlt that w1th the appearance ot Oaesar'a work a change 
would have to be made ln the statement that to wrlte history llke 
the Latlns, satla ~ B2R ~ mendacem?3 .. 
2 J. Wlght Dutt, A Llterarl Histor~ ot ~o.~ to th§ Olos! ~ the 
Golden Ai.!, Scribner'., ew tori; 1'§3, 38. 
3 Clcero, De Oratore Librl Trel' II, 51, introd. and notea b7 
Augustlne-S. Wilkins, diarenon Press, Oxtord, 1892. 
Obvlousl, the solutlon to .uch a questlon wl11 be tar trom 
easy. True; we could .elect a tew brlet phrases ~rom the Brutu., 
ln which Clcero use. Attlc •• a. a mouthplece to state what .e ma, 
presume to be hl. own oplnlon ot the .. excellent style ot the 
~~ 
Commentarle •• • How much truet we are to put ln these cltatlone, 
however, as reveallng the true mlnd ot Clcero; and how much should 
be attrlbuted to a d.elre to 'rub O&ee~ the rlght W&,;15 or, more 
sympathetlcally, how much ls to be attrlbuted to a slmple deslre 
to return Caesarts compllment ln dedlcatlng to the orator his 
Rl Analogla--these are matters hard to d.cld., lnvolvlng as they 
do a great knowledge of a troubled mlnd durlng troubled days. But 
thls much we can do. Taklng the ldeal of hlstorlcal composltlon 
as lt ls expressed by Cleero ln his rhetorlcal works (chletly ln 
the R! Oratore, whlch was publlshed ln 55) we oan attempt to deter 
mlne tor oUBselves whether or not such an ldeal ls adequately rt-
presented ln the Galllc !!£! whlch Were publlshed less than tlve 
years later, ln 51. It ln his later rhetorlcal works (publlshed 
after 51) Clcero glves his own word ot pralse to the Commentarles/ 
we wlll have perhaps a confirmatlon ot the view which holds that 
objectively 'oonsldered the Galllc War, marked a real advance ot 
.' Latln 11terature ln the tleld ot hlstory. It, however, Clcero 
falls to hall the work as an answer to his hopes, we need aot take 
4 Brutul, 262. 
5 Ct. Albert Grenler, The Roman Splrlt, Knopt, Hew York, 1926, 
221, n. 1. 
that tact as a retutatlon ot the same oplnion. The reason tor 
thls last statement wl11 be glven ln the last cha~ter. 
5 
Betore proceedlng to enumerate ln the thlrd chapter the pre-
.9 .,.; 
else polnts ot merlt which Clcero seeks ln hls ldeal hlstorlan, it 
wl11 be necessary to say something of the relatlon ot hlstory to 
rhetorio ln Latin Literature. Suoh a '1onslderation wl11 show 
why, ln splte ot the stead1 advance of Roman orator1, hlstor1 bad 
fal1ed to make a correspondlng progress, or to put lt another wa1, 
why the little hlstory that 41d appear, belng so identified with 
the oratorlcal splrlt, could hardly be distlnguished trom lt as 
an lndependent pursult. Thus we shall see the deticlencies in 
hlstorical composltlon whlch were almost necessar1 consequences 
ln an anclent state that was struggling tor polltlcal domlnatlon, 
rather than aimlng at an1 high culture mark. So, too, the ldeal 
""'" 
ot Clcero wl11 stand out ln bolder rellet when oontrasted wlth 
the inadequate types whloh preceded It. 
.. 
, 
.' OlUP!ER I 
HISTORY IN LATIN LITERATURE 
. The students of scientific method have long discussed the 
quest10n whether history ls a sclencj 'r an art. Whatever ma, 
be our vlews as to the practlea11tr of such a subject as a polnt 
of debate, 1 t liar at least be salet tha'l 1 t servel to keep prom1-
nant1y betore our 8yes the two great requlslte. of all good his-
torical compolitlon. They have, unfortunately, been all too rare-
ly tound in that branch ot 11terature ln the tine proportlon that 
marks the pertect work. Few masters of .clentifl0 historlcal 
scholarship bave been able to produoe the plctured page of the 
artl.tic writer. Though their work may de11ght the hearts ot .tu-
dents, the, are cavlar tor the general. On the other hand, though 
Macau1ay t s style was consldered a flttlng model tor the schoo1b07, 
..,. 
he was known to wink at the taots on more than one ocoallon. Nor 
is thls a phenomenon peculiar to modern tlmes. It is rather a 
weakness 1nherent in humanlty ltse1t which tlnds it dltticu1t to 
, 
comblne the exce11enoes ot two pursuitl-a painstaking considera-
tion and w.~ghlng ot all the tacts, and an eftective and interest-
lng presentatlon ot the tacts when tound. .. 
And so we tlnd that with the anclents too, the comblnat10n 
of these two characterlstics ls also rare. In the case ot the 
Greeks, lt we exclude Herodotus and Thucyd14e., lt may be sald ln 
general that there was a greater conoentratlon on ars than on the 
researoh necessary tor good h1story. The latter, lt ls true, they 
did not 19nore. Yet they were more apt to use lt as a sprlngboard 
tor the presentatlon ot some precono!l!ed theory. Francls Godol-
phln ls not alone when he aays ln regard to Greek h1atorr: 
Yet so strong 1. lntereat ln tora &aong the 
anolents that the lnterlor ~storlans are apt 
to turn history into a serie' ot rhetorioal 
dlspl81 pieces, bullding up an impresslve mass 
ot antltheses and arguments trom probablllt, 
to the exclusion ot the tacts, just as the ora-
tors argued ca.es trom probabllity lnstead ot 
clt1ng the taots, elen when the tacts were 1n 
the oratorts tavor. 
Early Roman hlstory went to the opposite extreme. Admltt1ng tor 
the moment that the Pontitlcal Annals make up la preoious docu-
ment, whlch constltutes the chlef and on17 authent1c source ot 
our knowledge ot Roman bistory,·2 they oan,hard11 lnterest anyone 
but the protesslonal scholar, or a man whose own v1vld h18tor~1 
lmaglnatlon oan construct tor hlmselt the background whlch the 
reoorders themaelvea negleoted to portray. They are desorlbed by 
01cero as annale, Rontlf1cum max1morum, gulbus nihil potest ess, , 
inlucundius. 3 
Later, however, when the Romans flrst began to substLtute 
connected history ln prose tor these mere tabulat1ons, thelr 
1 FranCis Godolph1n, The Greek Historian" Random House, New York, 
1942, I, xvl. 
2 Grenler, 106. 
3 !! Legibus, I, 6. 
8 
.,' 
work, as tar as selence was concerned, labored under the same 
detects ot lnaoouraol (It not posltlve dlstortlon) as dld manl 
works ot the Greeks. Thus Nrablus belonged to the !!n! Fabla, and 
hls work must have been, betore all,.,..,raanlfestatlon ot that arls-
tocratle prlde which Oato pursued everywhere wlth obstlnate ha-
tred. Even Ennlu •••• had bad to lndulge the genealoglcal fancles 
ot his protector •• •4 And hlstorlcal t';uth suffered Just as much 
when Oato mentloned ln hls own work no proper names except that ot 
Slrus, the bravest of P,rrho's elephanta. But whlle we may sal 
that the Greeks, ln sacrlflclng sclencs, had preserved art, we 
cannot malte the sam. excuse for the Roman.. In the same passage 
as that quoted above, 01cero despalrlngly aslts: Quamquam ex hl. 
allus all0 plus habet vlrlua , tamen quld tam exlle guam lstl 
omnes,5 
How, were we to seek the tun4amental explanatlon for the 
sclentltlc deflclenclea common to so much ot anclent hlstorlcal 
composltlon, we would flnd lt to be the rhetorlcal turn of mlnd 
wh1ch, though not, of course, pecu11ar to Greece and Rome, was 
certalnly one ot thelr predomlnant characterlstlcs. True lt 1s 
that ln an age accustomed to the prlnted word ln book, magazlne, 
and newspaper, we f1nd lt hard to rea11ze that the plac. ot all 
4 Grenler, 151 
5 De Leg1bus, I, 6. 
, 
9 
.' 
these moulders of public opinion was once chiefly supplied by the 
spoken word. If, however, we attempt to reconstruct these ancient 
conditions, it will no longer seem surprising that for the Greeks 
and the Romans rhetoric (which in Oup.~!ctionaries is defined as 
the "art of discourse,lt) should have become almost synonymous 
with oratory,6 and that the norms of historical composition should 
'. have been almost completely neglected? in a society where men were 
more often engaged in the political arena8 than in study or lite-
rary pursuits. Vifhat James Shotwell says of the Greeks may with 
the obvious 'changes be applied to the Romans: 
Moreover,oratory in a Greek city, was a 
real force. The arena of politics was hard-
ly larger than the amphitheatre or the agora, 
and it was possible to control it almo~t as 
definitely by the voice and personality of a 
speaker.9 
As a natural consequence, even when men did withdraw from publi~ 
life to write history (a possibility more likely to be realized 
among the speculative Greeks than the practical Romans)lO the 
6 James Shotwell, Introduction to the History of History, Columbia 
University<Press, New York, 1936, 183. 
? De Oratore, II, 63. "Harum tot tantarumque rerum videtisne nulla 
esse praecepta, quae in artibus rhetorum reperiantur?11 
8 Ibid., II, 55. " ... nemo enim studet eloquentiae nostrorum homi-
nu:m; nisi ut in causis atque in foro eluceat ••• II 
9 Shotwell, 183. 
10 De Oratore, II, 55. II ••• apud Graecos a utem eloquentissimi homi-
nes remoti a causis forensibus cwa ad ceteras res inlustres tum 
ad historiam scribendam maxime se applicaverunt ••• " 
.' 10 
attltude they adopted towards their vork vaa far dlfferent tro. 
the ac1entitlc vlev of the modern hlstorlan. The dealre to per-
suade (often at any cost) found It.a ,vay into h1story as well. An 
it may not be aa14 that thl. "rhetoric1zing" tendency leaaene4 
with the years, at leaat untl1 the advent of Polyblua. For wlth 
the appearance of laocrates and his cultivated style ln the age 
succeeding !hucydldea and Xenophon, historlans became even more 
loneerned vith the ~ which ls indeed a requis1te ot history, 
but not as essentlal as the veracltas whlch they were often too 
ready to sacrlflce. If history bad freed itself from the clutehe. 
at poetry vith the vork of Thucydides,ll it ia equal11 true that 
it valked into the Jaws of rhetoric in the age that followed. 
Thus Werner Jaeger says of Isocrates, the leader of the new move-
••• Hor can we trace haw his politlcal pre-
conceptions altered his vi.w of the hi.to-
rical facts which he urged to support them, 
although it would be extremely interesting 
to aee how, when historical knOWledge comes , 
into contact with his political interesta, 
it is always ~Itory vhich ia altered, to 
sui t his wish~ 
So, too, a pupil of his, Ephorus, "rejected the &deal ot !hucydi-
des to keep bis apeeches cloaely modeled upon the originals. 
He frankly made them up and waa e.pecially given ,t~ harangues 
11 Werner Jaeger, Paideia, trans1. by Gilbert Highet, Oxtord 
University Press, New York, 1944, III, 311, n. 102. 
12 Ibid" 103. 
,. 
11 
.' 
upon the field of battle.-13 Another pupil, !heopompus, 'empl07ed 
all the artifices of rhetorio to seoure effect, -~ Greek Kacaula7 
or Treitschke. 114 Timaeus of 5ici11 might endear himselt to the 
modern historian b7 hi8 statement th4t~'hi8tory difter8 trom 
rhetorical composition as much as real buildings differ from thoae 
represented in acene-paintings,"16 and that Ito collect the neoes-
sar7 materials for writing histor7 is t7 itselt more laborious 
than the whole prooes8 of produoing rhetorical 00mpositions."1S 
But it we are to Judg~ by the comments ot Po1ybius, he waa guilt7 
of the 8ina he preached against.1' 
It would be well to state here, however, that this confusion 
of the oratorical with the historical is on17 one of the causes 
of the interior18 type ot hiatoriograpby .. ong the Greeks. Thus 
we may have what Godolphin calls the "s7stematic error" ot the 
~ 
historian. Th1a i8 the excessive use of a general principle 'by 
meana of which he interprets events to the excluslon of contri-
buting or material causes whlch should be assigned their proper 
place it the interpretation is not to be distorted. M19 Herodotu8 
13 Shotwell! 185. 
1" ~., ls6. .' 
16 Quoted b7 Polybius, Hiatoriae.12.28 a 1, ed. b7 Th. Buttner-
Wobst, Teubner. Leipzig, III, 1883. 
16 Ibid., 12, 28 a 2. 
17 tbId., 12, 24. 5; 25 a. 6; 26 b. 6. 
18 ~interior·t we mean trom the scientific, not the artistic 
or humanistic aspect. 
19 Godolphin, xiv. 
, 
12 
for example, ln his deslre to prove the truth ot dlvlne retrlbu-
tlon, gave a protracted account of a meetlng betveen Oroesua and 
Solon-although all his readers must have reallzed tha~ such a 
meetlng was a chronologlcal lmposslb~i4ty. " ••• this meetlng vaa 
so vell adapted to the reflectlons he wlshed to lntroduce on the 
subject of the autabl11ty ot human 11te and divlne retrlbutlon 
'. that he felt under no obllgatlon to respeot the taot that the 
meetlng was Imposslble."20 Thls explanatlon sounds tantastl0 to 
ua who are aocuatomed to the exactlng requlrementa ot contempora-
ry sclentltlc prooedure, but It dld not seem so outrageous to the 
Greek mentallty. 
Another tendency detractlng trom hlstorlcal aocuracy was the 
contuslon of history wlth tragedy whlch characterlzed a great 
deal ot thls branch of 11terature trom Thucydldes to Polyblus.~ 
It Is true that Arlstotle saw the dlstinctlon between the two. 
Hlstory tells what happened; tragedy what 11ght BaTe happened, 
or mlght happen. Whether or not the other Greeks recognlzed the , 
dlfterence is beside the polnt. Results show that ln practlce 
ther "felt that historr could profltablr emplor the devices of 
poetry, even to deviatlng from exact truth." 21 
20 Ibld., xli1. 
21 !:I: Ullman, "Hlstorr and Tragedy,' Transactlon of the 
Amerloan Phl1010gical As.oolati~p, LXXIII, (19421; 27. 
.' 
13 
Without denying the importance of such factors as these in 
the development of Greek history, we have limited Qurselves in 
this thesis to a consideration of the rhetorical color of ancient 
history. We have done so because thi~41s a tendency that charac-
terized both Greek and Roman history, and not Greek history alone. 
In fact, the influence of rhetoric is particularly marked in Roman 
'. literature (with which we are more concerned in this thesis.) 
For this two causes are responsible - the political circumstances 
at Rome up to the time of Augustus; secondly, the very character 
of the Roman mentality. 
We may sum up the first cause by stating that while the Ro~ 
mans had found it profitable to follow the bad example of the 
Greeks in distorting history, they did not find it conducive to 
their own practical ends to follow the good example that the 
Greeks also gave. In other words, with the advent of Polybius 
in the second century B.C., Greek history became more or less 
subordinated to philosophy instead of to rhetoric. We cannot say,' 
however, that Roman history made the corresponding change. For 
while it "no doubt underwent the influence of the philosophical 
.. 
influence of Polybius, and still more of Posidonius ••• !122 yet it 
can still be said of the Roman historians that: 
22 Grenier, 221. 
r 
••• on the whole they seea to be the pupils 
of the rhetors much aore than ot the phi-
losophers. History tor them is really only 
a kind ot torensic speech, in which the nar-
rative is the principal eleaent; the techni-
cal methods and orn8llents are the SUle as 1n 
&Dy other oratorical work~.·~he political 
passion by which they are animated and the 
great part played by eloquence in Roman lite 
clearly contribute to this conoeption. 23 
.' 
14 
The Augustan age waa yet to come. Men.could still speak their 
minds in the Forum and in the Senate. And while they could do so, 
speoulative history was not tor them. Jaeger say~ ot real poli-
tical oratory in Greece that -nourished by the lite ot the Greek 
oity-atate, it 41ed when that di8d. 124 In Rome politioal oratory 
was to tlourish aa long as the Republic lasted. And as long &8 
it tlourished, history would make little progress. 
We sai4 that the second reason for stressing the intluence 
A-
ot ~ratory on Roman histor1~1ting was the mentality ot the Roman 
people. By this we mean that the errors or defects ot Greek 
hi.toriography~he ·systematic error· ot Herodotus, and the con· 
fusion ot tragedJ with history-oould hardly be the detects ot the 
Roman writer. For these are not the errors ot the practical but 
ot the speculative mind. The error ot the Roman is, as we •. shall 
notice in the briet review ot their eftorts at history, due aore 
23 Ibld. 
24 Jaeger, 102; ct. Wllkins, 45. 
, 
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to a utll1tarlan outlook. 25 The saae fundamental attltude that 
acoounts for the ease and enthuslasm wlth whlch R~me adapted her-
self to oratory, also explalns her slowness to make any remarka-
ble advance ln history. 
As we have sald, 01cero reallzed how tar behlnd Ro.e was ln 
this fleld. All ln all the record was'l1one· too enoouraglng, for 
him at least. When Antonlus ask. Catulus, ~ualls oratorls et 
quantl ho.lnls ln dloendo putas esse hlstorlaa sorlbere' the 
answer ls 81. ut Gra.ol sorlpserunt. summl.,.sl, ut nostrl. nlhll 
opus est oratorei satls est non esse m.n4&ce •• 26 Yet we are 
afrald that even this poor estlmate of Rome's historlans 1s a llt-
tle more than they deserved. For many of them even found lt hard 
!2 tell lh!. truth, aa we ahall aee lf we look back now wlth Clcero 
over the paat. 
The account of early Roman hlstorlography ls well known. 
The rellglous records, 1.e. the Llbrl Pontlfloum, Oommentarl1 
Pgntlflcum, Fastl and Annales together wlth the reoords of the 
clvle oftlolals, the Ooamentarll Kaglstratuum comprlse the earll-
est Roman h1atory.27 Of the prlvate doouments "ohlefly ln the 
.. 
25 Duff, 148 
26 De Oratore, II, 51. 
27 Mirlon Dlttman, ln "The Development ot Hlatorlography Among 
the Romana,· Olaasloal Journal, XXX, (1934-5), 287-300, glves 
a brlef aummary ot Wlght Duff on thls subJeot. 
, 
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form of family cllronicles to gratify patrician pride by panegyrics 
on ancestors,"28 we may say that when a man is "guip-ed by the 
practical purpose of placing his notion, family, party or person 
in a favorable light, It it is not to be;. '-6xpected that we take all 
that is written in such documents without a grain of salt. For 
after all, the writers followed the convention of composing them 
'. with their tongues in their cheeks. The same caution may be ap-
plied to the laudationes funebres of which Cicero himself has 
said, his laudationibus historia rerum nostrarum est facta men-
dosior. 29 
About the end of the third century these official and private 
documents were complemented, but not supplanted, by the first ef-
forts of the Romans to write connected history. Strange ly enough, 
~ Fabius Pictor, Cincius.Alimentus, Acilius and Postumius Albinus 
did not write in Latin because, according to Duff, "the superior-
ity of Greek authors to the official Latin records determined 
, 
that the first Romans to attempt connected history in prose should 
use the' Greek language."30 To Cato, the anti-Hellenist, goes the 
honor of being the first Roman historian to write in his na~ive 
28 Duff, 86. 
29 Brutus, 62. 
30 Duff, 248. 
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tongue. 3l Hls Orlglnes was a step torward beoause ln lt Oato rose 
to a broader vlew ot Roman hlstory, oonslderlng t~e development ot 
Rome ln oonnectlon wlth the other Itallan settlements.32 Hls re-
action agalnst the Fablan propaganda,.1» omlttlng the names ot gen-
erals, etc., has already been mentloned.33 MThe reason of thls 
lt ls lmposslble to dlsoover ••• Dlsllke ot the great arlstooratl0 
houses lnto whloh the supreme power val steadily being concentrat-
ed,ls a more probable oauae."34 It ls, at any rate, a good lndi-
oation of the lack ot obJeotlvlty in one whom Qulntlllan can still 
oall the founder of Roman h1stor7. 35 
The style ot Oato as well as that of Oalpurniue Plsa who 
·ccnoelved the plan ot reduc1ng the myths to histor1cal probablll-
ty,"36 is unenthuslastioally evaluated by Oicero 1n the De 
Oratore: 
31 Grenler (p. 151) ls wronf in saying that Oato had an immed1ate 
predeoessor ln Fabius. Q. Fablus Plctor wrote in Greek, and 
was an earller contemporary ot Oato; but the Lat1n version ot 
h1s work was later than Oato's Origines." Wllklns, ibld., 251~ 
32 Ohar1es Crutwel1, H6sto~ ~ Roman Literature, Ohar1~rlttln, 
London, 1910, 100. 2!.uft, 251. 
33 Ot. pageo,Sabove. 
34 nrutwell, 95. 
35 Qulntillan, Institutlon1s Orator1ae Librl Duodeclm, XII;' 11, 
23, ed. by Bonnell, Teubner, Lelpzlg, 1903, 11.-
35 Orutwel1, 100. 
.' 
••• erat enlm hlstorla nlhil allud nlsl annallum 
contectl0, oUJus rel memorlaeque publlcae retl-
nendae oausa ab lnltl0 rerum Romanarum usque ad 
P. Muclum pontltlcem maxlmum res omnls slngulo-
rum annorum mandabat lltterl. pontltex maxlmus 
referebatque ln album et proponebat tabulam 40-
.1, potestas ut esset popul8.ognosoendl. elqua 
atlam nunc annalas maxlml nomlnantur: hanc s1-
mllltudlnem scrlbendl multl secut1 sunt, qul 
nunc slne ullls ornamentls monumenta solum tem-
porwa, homlnwn, locorum gestarumque rerum rell-
querunt; ltaque quaIls apud a.Aecos Pherec1de., 
Hellanlcus, Acusllas fult a111que permu1tl, ta-
lls noster Oato et Plctor et Plso, qul neque te-
nent, qulbus rebus ornetur oratl0 - modo enlm 
huc lsta sunt lmportata - et, dum lntelllgatur 
quld dlcant!,unam dleendl laudem putant esse 
brevltatell. 
18 
An lmprovemant, howeyer, both ln the artlstlc and sclentltlc 
aspect ot hlstorlcal eOllposltlon was marked wlth the appearance 
of Oaellus Antlpater and 8empronlus Aselll0 ln that perlod ot 
Roman 11 tarature whloh we mlght say roughly·· corresponds to the 
age ot lsoerates ln Greece. 
, 
Antlpater went to the trouble ot look 
lng tor sources favorable to the Oarthaglnlan cause ln hls work 
on the Punlc War. Aselll0 gave the tlrst real evldenee ot the 
attempt to treat the causal element ln Roman hlstory.3S Another f 
lndloatlon of progress was had ln the work ot Olaudlus Quadrlga-
rlus who completely omltted the mythloal perlod. 'fhls was an 
.. 
lmportant step slnce lt showed that, lt nothing certaln could be 
37 ~ Oratore, II, 52-53 
38 Dutt, 263; Orutvell, 100. 
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.' known about the past, some .en were at least resolved not to In-
vent thelr own accounts. But J though the archalc s,tyle ot Quadrl-
garius tound favor with some, especlally Gelllus, no .entlon ls 
even made ot hl. by Clcero ln hls reY~. ot the hlstorlans. 
Lest we think that all the work ot this period showed steadJ 
progress ln accuracy, lt will be good t~conslder three ot its more 
well-known writers. Valerlus Antlas, who echoes the note ot the 
laudatlones funebre~, by hls partlallty to the Valerl1, has galned 
through Llv,'s pages the "unenvlable notorlety ot belng the most 
lylng ot all the annallsts. The chlet cause of hls deceptlveness 
was the tabrlcatlon ot clrcumstantlal narratlve, and the lnvention 
ot exact numerical accouDts."~9 Although Galus Llolnlus Macer 
clalmed to have used certaln anclent records whlch bad escaped aore 
scholarly and rellable men than hlmselt, the common oplnlon ot him 
... 
ls that expressed by H.J.Rose, when he says "Bven the uncrltlcal 
Llvy oaught hlm lylng ln the lnterests ot hls tamlly, and that he 
should tell another lle to the enhancement ot hls own reputatlon 
ls ln no way lmprobable.",e As a third example, We .entlon Sulla 
who, llke Caesar, has wrltten Com.ntarl1 Rerum Suarwg but whose 
antl-Marlan purpose, betrayed on so many of lts pages, deprives 
the work ot the tltle ot hlstory.4l 
39 Crutwell, 101; .Q.t. H.J.Rose, A Handbook ot Latln Llterature, 
Methuen, London 1936, 202. 
40 Rose, 203; Ct. Crutwell. 102. 
41 Dutt, 254. 
, 
20 
.' To summarlze, up untll the tlme ot 01cero, there was lacklng 
ln Roman hlstorlcal co.positlon, either are or veracitas, or that 
flne combination of both quallties of whlch we spoke at the begin-
ning of this chapter. !he deficienc~~ the artistic side mlght 
be explained by the fact that the aore capable men were engaged in 
the poll tical struggle - • f1eld open to all during the ti8e of th 
Republic. !he defic1ency in sCientifi~·outlook may bave a double 
explanation. first, we have seen that those who did give them-
selves to wrlting history were, for the most part, a little too 
interested in personal motlves, instead of belng animated with 
that zeal for handing down truth to posterity which 18 the mark of 
the true historian. Secondly, the rhetoricai education of that 
time (at least untll 91 B.O., the ti8e represented 1n the De Ora-
tore) ignored the norms for historical OOmpos1tlon,42 or presented 
them w1th an oratorical flavor. 43 
Was lt thls latter deflclency that 01cero was attempt1ng to 
supply ln the second book of the De Ora tore? We should not try 
to exaggerate the slgn1flcance of a relatlvely brlef passage, 
presented almost by way of a d1gression. Yet lt 18 lmportant 
42 ~ Oratore, II, 62. 
43 Ullman, 33. 
.' 
, 
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enough as .& piece ot literary critic1sm. Shotwell calls it a 
.chapter ot the history ot History in miniature, t~e tirst and 
only one in Latin 1iterature. M44 Atter this briet treatment ot 
the relation ot rhetoric to h1story ~· ..... ncient time., and with an 
equally briet survey and evaluation ot the Roman historians serv-
ing as a background, we are now better prepared to sketch Cicero'. 
theory - it would be too amb1tious to c~l it a philosophy - of 
history. 
.. 
44 Shotwell, 214. 
CHAPTER II 
CICERO'S IDEAL HISTORIAN 
Although referencea to hlstorlca~~~omposltlon are quite nu-
merous in the essays and dlalogues ot Cicero, lt must be admltted 
that most ot them refer to style rather than to method. Moreover, 
after reading his remarks (in the pass~;e from the ~ Orator, 
referred to at the end ot the last chapter) on the lmportance ot 
truth and accuracy in history, we find one or two other passages 
which appear to contradict his recommendatlon. In the Brutus, for 
example, he states that conoessu. est rhetorlbus ementlrl ln h1s-
tgriis. ut a11Quid dicere posalnt arSUt1us.1 Now if we reea11 the 
narrow margln separatlng the rhetorlclan trom the hiltorian ln an-
Cient tlmel, and lf We conslder the fact that "history vaa added 
by some· to the genus demonstratlv¥!, the th1rd divlalon of e1~ 
quence, Yand Clcero lnollnes to agree w1th them,·2 we oan 1maglne 
the havoc vh1ch mlght well be oaused by a too llberal 1nterpreta-
tion of th1s lndulgence. So too, when Antonius exolalms; Hlstorla 
varo testls temporum, lux varltatls, vlta memoriae, "glstra vitae 
. 
nuntla vetu.tati •• qua voce a11a ni.l orator1s lmmorta11tati 
.-
1 Brutus, 42. 
2 Wilkins, 244. Ct. also Cicero, Orator, 37, 66, 207, ed. and 
transl. by H.X;-Hubbell, Harvard Unlverslty Press, Cambr1dge, 
1942; R! Oratore, II, 62 il Leglbul, I, 5. 
~ 
commendatur?3 It ls easy to understand why so much ot Roman hlsto-
- . 
ry was unrellable. 4 
But whatever may be the Inconslstencles, apparent or other-
~. 
w1se, In the other passages ot Clcero, the part ot h1s work In 
wh1ch we are chlefly 1nterested g1ves a br1ef but deflnlte concept 
of what the historlan should be. The 0icaslon for the passage ls 
as follows. Antonlus (whom, we may take as representlng Clcero's 
oplnlon)5 Is telllng hls 11steners at Crassus' Tusculan vllla that 
3 De Oratore, II, 36. 
4 ~lntl11an 1. sometlmes consldered to contuse hlstory wlth ora-
tory, and the text, "sed etfectlvae quoque allquld s181le scrlp-
tis oratlonlbu. vel histor11s, ~uoi 19SUM ~ !! p;)te oratorla 
m,rlto ponlmus, consequetur,· (-Ai-- rat.~ 18, Is quoted 
to support this Tlew. But we do not thlnk that such an Inter-
pretation 1& warranted by the context. Speaklng ot hlstory In 
another place (Ibid. X, 1, 31) Quintlllan·says, "Est enim proxl-
ma poetls ••• et scrlbltur ad narrandum, non ad probandum; totum-
que opus non ad actum rei pugnamque praesenl$m sed ad memorl" 
posteritat1s et Ingenll famam componltur." (Itallcs mlne.) 
Furthermore, we must remember that the speclflc term, oratory, 
was often used for the generlc rhetorlc, for reasons we have 
trled to 1nd1cate In the precedlng chapter. 
5 " •.• the De Oratore, where the conversatlonal form Is but a con-
venlent framework for the expositlon of theorles somet1mes from' 
different po1nts of vlew, but as a rule unchallenged, 1n the 
way of cont1nuous expositlon." W1lklns, 3. 
.. 
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although history is an art comparable to oratory, no rules for itl 
composition have been developed among the Romans because they, un· 
like the Greeks, are not interested ~n anything much besides the 
~~ . 
eloquence of the assembly or the law-courts. He then proceeds to 
give some rules of his own. We shall first quote the passage in 
its entirety, dividing it, however io,o three sections. Section 
I corresponds roughly to the first requisite of history - veraci· 
tas. Section II corresponds to the second requisite -~, and 
........ 
is subdivided into ~, dealing with the presentation and arrange-
ment of the subject matter; and b, dealing with the style. 
I ?lam quis nescit primam esse legem, ne 
qUid falsi dicere audeat? Deinde ne quid 
veri non audeat? Ne quae suspicio gratiae 
sit in scribendo? Ne quae simultatis? 
Haec scilicet fundamenta nota sunt omnibus, 
IIa ipsa autem aedificatio posita est in rebus ~ 
et in verbis: rerum ratio ordinem temporum 
desiderat, regionum descriptionemj volt, 
etiam, quoniam in rebus magnis memoriaque 
dignis consilia primum, deinde acta, pos-
tea eventus exspectantur, et de consiliis 
significari quid scriptor probet et in , 
rebus gestis declarari non solum quid ac-
tum aut dictum sit, sed etiam quo modo, et 
cum de eventu dicatur, ut causae explicen-
tur omnes vel casus vel sapientiae vel te-
meritatis hominumque ipsorum non solum res ._ 
gestae, sed etiam, qui fama et nomine ex-
cellant, de cuJusque vita atque natura. 
lIb verborum autem ratio et genus orationis 
fusum atque tractum et cum lenitate qua-
dam aequabiliter profluens sine hac iu-
dicali asperitate et sine sententiarum 
forensibus aculeis persequendum est. 
~---------------------------------------. 
Harum tot tantarumque rerum vldetlsne- nulla 
esse praecepta, quae ln artlbus rhetorum re-
per1antur?6 
25 
The qualltles mentloned ln the flrst sectlon are essentlal 
. 
~~ 
to the hlstorlan slnce they regard the truth of hls work. Desplte 
the fact that Antonlus says, "These fundamental rules are doubt-
less unlversally known, "7 they are the.vlrtues so often conspl-
cuous by thelr absence ln so much of the work of the anclent 
hlstor1ans.S In the next chapter lt wlll be our purpose to con-
s1der how far these rules were observed by Caesar. Has the author 
of the Commentarles ever been proved gullty of falsehood? Has he 
always told the whole truth, 1.e., has he employed the rhetorl-
c1an's trlck of passlng over slgn1flcant facts to pl.O. hls own 
poslt10n 1n a more favorable - or untrue 11ght? And (slnce we are 
treatlng of an autob10graphy) does the personal element enter so 
~ 
much lnto the narratlve of that most extraord1nary and slgnlflcant 
campalgn, as to magnlfy beyond proport10n the servlces rendered 
to the state durlng those e1ght years? In other words, what 1s 
the credlb111ty of the Galllc Wars? 
.. 6 ~ Oratore, II, 62-64. 
7 De ~~atore, Ibld., 62, transl. by J.B.Watson, KcKay, Phlladel-
Ph1a, 1897, 112. 
8 Clcero hlmself ln Ad Fam. 5:12 "urges Lucce1us to wrlte a sepa-
rate hlstory of h1S-consulshlp ••• and to neglect the laws of 
hlstory to the extent of glor1fylng Clcero a b1t more than the 
str1ct regard for the truth mlght warrant." Ullman, 44. 
, 
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The po1nts ment10ned 1n the next sect10n of the passage trom 
the Q! Oratore are calculated to secure not truthf~, but art1st1c 
or l1terary h1story. The f1rst d1v1s1on ot th1s sect10n - dea11ng 
w1th the presentat10n of the subject',4Ilatter - emphas1zes two qua-
l1t1es. One ot these, clearness, 1s an obv10us necess1ty. The 
other, 1 the h1stor1cal sense of coherency, was never too apparent 
'. 1n the work ot the Roman anna11st. C1cero'i words 1n th1s passage 
cons1l1a, eventus, causae, casus, sap1ent1ae, temer1tatla, show 
that he is tired of the mere listing of events and desires some-
thing of the intelligent procedure of a Thucydides. It is probab-
ly this concern for causa11ty that is responsible for the remarks 
he makes on characterization. Since men make history more than 
history makes men, 1t 1s important for the historian to show how 
the life or attitudes of men were responsible for certa1n act1ons. 
How far these h1nts for historic craftsmanship were carried ou~in 
the Gal11c Wars, will be shown in the f1rst part of the fourth 
chapter. 
The second div1sion of this section (rIb) treats ot a sub-
ject most dear to Cicero, the style of h1story. We stated at the 
beginning of th1s chapter that most of his hints for historical 
composition treat of th1s element rather than of method. And al-
most all of his criticism of the historians before his time is 
d1rected at the1r lack of excellence in this regard. 9 ·Style it 
9 Cf. ~ Oratore, II, 63, 64; and ~ Legibus, I, 6, 6, 7. 
, 
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1s," we seem to hear him say, "that will produce a work likely to 
be read not only by scholars, but by all men of cu~ture. It may 
produce something to rival the work of a Thucydides or an Herodo-
tus." Cicero was looking for a hist'~~ that would have about it 
a qua11ty so badly lacking in the work of Piso, annales ~ ex1-
l1ter scriptos.10 Was he to find some answer to h1s hopes in the 
'. work of Caesar of "all our orators ••• the purest user of the Latin 
tongue?"ll The second part of the fourth chapter will attempt an 
answer to th1s quest1on.12 
10 Brutus, 106. 
11 IbId., 252, "Sed tamen, Brute, inqu1t Atticus, de Caesape et 
ipse 1ta Judico, et de hoc hujus gener1s acerr1mo aestimatore 
saepissime audio, illum omnium fere oratorum Latine loqui 
elegantissime.' 
12 There are other references to the kind of style suitable to 
history which will be considered in the fourth chapter. 
, 
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true, mention the main charges considered by Mr. Holmes and summa-
rize the conclusions of this recognized Caesarian scholar. In so 
doing the aim will be only to show the typical tenuousness of .ost 
of the accusations of distortion. But4~he plan of defense adopted 
for this part of our thesis is simpler and,we think, of equal if 
not greater cogency. It consists in arguing from the circumstan--
'. ces at the time of publication, and from the motives of Caesar in 
composing the Gallic Wars to the following conclusion: This work 
comprises an accurate and credible account of one of Rome's great 
military campaigns. In other words, because of the absence of 
convincing proof of falsehood, the circumstantial evidence to be 
presented in this chapter suffices to give a prudent certitude of 
the reliability of Caesar in this record of his successes. 
The connection, then, of this chapter with the rest of the~ 
thesis is clear. If it shall be established beyond reasonable 
doubt that the Gallic Wars fulfill the first set of prescriptions 
laid down by Cicero for good historical composition, the conclu-
sion shall be that this work of Caesar's holds a partial claim,Jt 
least, to b~ing the first Roman literary history worthy of the 
name. Let us proceed, therefore, to the consideration of tne 
conformity of the Commentaries to the Ciceronian norms for histo-
rical veracity which were quoted in the last chapter. 
It will.be recalled that the first rule for reliable h1story~ 
r 
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accordlng to Clcero, If, ••• ne quld falsl dlcere audeat. Delnde ne 
9u1d verl non audeat. 3 Before examlnlng the charge~ of falsehood 
in the Galllc !!£!, lt wll1 be necessary to conslder what purpose 
Caesar had ln composlng these account~~~ For unless we are to as-
sume the falslty of the prlnclple, nemo g£atls mendax, lt follows 
that Caesar wll1 devlate from the truth only when hls maln purpose 
'. may be better attained. Now there are two theorles of his purpose 
in writing this hlstory,4 both of which theories require an unders-
tanding of the politlcal sltuation at the time of composltion if 
they are to be grasped in their full slgnificance. 
Two years after returning to Rome from Spain where he had 
been praetor ln 62 B.C., Caesar formed that strange coalltlon with 
Pompey and Crassus - the democrat with the former champions of the 
senatorial party. Caesar, it was agreed, should become the consul 
~ 
ln 59. Thls he dld and ln that famous consulshlp of "Jullus and 
Caesar' carrled through many measures ln favor of Pompey whlch the 
Eastern conqueror hlmself had been unable to secure. Followlng 
his consulship Caesar chose for his province the governorship of 
'3 
3 De Ora tore, II, 62. •. 
4 X-thlrd theory, that Caesar wrote the Galllc Wars w~th a litera-
ry purpose alone (as in the case of the De AniIOiia) mlght be 
oonsidered by some too naive. 
J 
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Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul - ~or a period o~ ~ive years.5 
Now, i~ it is true that most students are never taught the lite-
rary signi~icance o~ the Gallic Wars, the same can be repeated with 
emphasis o~ the signi~icance of the c~~aigns which they describe. 
They were momentous both~or the city o~ Rome (and ultimately 
~'!estern civilization) and :for Caesar hi~el~. But although it is 
true that "Caesar's greatest accomplishment was in turning the 
face of Vledi terranean city-culture toward Western continental 
Europe,"6 it is rather the personal advantages o~ that campaign 
which concern us now. 
Ever since the civil wars of Marius and Sulla, the army had 
begun to exert a new influence in the state, an influence which 
it would continue to exert in the days of the Empire. "The sol-
~ diers would not fight for any commander unle ss they knew him well 
and had served under him long, and unless they could expect ~rom 
him the same rewards that Sulla had given to his veterans."7 That 
, 
in his own case a Gallic campaign skilfully conducted could satis~y 
this very need, Caesar certainly realized. There was another 
.. 
5 Suetonis, Lives of the Caesars, Divus Julius, XXII, ed. and 
transl. by J.C.Rolfe;-Putnam's, New York, 1928, I. 
6 Norman J. De Witt, tiThe Non-Political Nature o~ Caesar's Com-
mentaries," TAPA LXXIII, (1942), 345. 
7 M. Rostovtze~~, A History o~ the Ancient World, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1927, II, 129. 
! 
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advantage it would serve. Although Pompey was a fellow-triumvir 
Oaesar knew that the former was very anxious to be the first man 
1n the state and was only biding his time for a favorable opportu-
n1ty. Pompey's constant changes in p&l~cy was sufficient indica-
t10n of that. 'What Caesar needed, then, above all was a military 
reputation to rival that of the conquer~: of Syria, Bithynia and 
Pontus. And what more likely place to secure that reputation than 
1n the land of the Gauls - Rome's ancient and recent foe?8 Des-
p1te all his excesses, Marius had endeared himself to the Roman 
people by averting the invasion of the Tutones and the Cimbri. 
What could not Caesar attain by subjecting an equally dangerous 
host to the standards of Rome? 
However, although we are the first to admit the personal mo-
tives of Caesar in carrying on the Gallic Wars, it does not seem 
~ 
necessary to conclude that he felt under any obligation to defend 
his war as a Just one. The attempt to read such an interpretation 
into Caesar's account of his campaign arises, we think, from our 
own modern ethical standards which were unknown to him and to most 
of the Romans. In a discussion of ancient systems of internati 
ethics, Louise E. Matthei states: .' 
8 Napoleon III, Julius Caesar, Cassell, Petter and Galpin, London, 
II, 1865, 8-13. 
l~------~ 
••• there runs throughout Roman history a be-
lief quite extraordinarily strong that suc-
cess in arms depended on the righteousne~s of 
the war - not righteousness as regards the justice of the interests involved or the 
claims advanced, but in the sense of having 
scrupulously fulfilled all',$o.e formal and ce-
remonial obligations owed to the other side, 
most especially those involved in the due 
declaration of war. 9 
.,' 
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It is this attitude that explains how Cjesar himself can admit so 
naively from time to time that it is for their liberty that the 
Gauls are fighting,lO while there is a suppressed feeling of in-
dignation when he tells of their frequent breaches of treaties and 
armistices in defending that very liberty.ll No matter what 
rights the Romas had to Gaul, the Gauls should play according to 
the rulesl 
If Caesar was interested in proving the morality of his ac-
tions, he was not doing as good a job as h.e ordinarily did. Tl'1\ 
truth of the matter is that his actions needed no justification -
in the eyes of the Romans. His countrymen were rapidly becoming 
empire-conscious and, despite th.e remarks of Suetonius,12 such a ' 
people seldom views with horror accounts of unknown native 
.. 
9 Louise E. Matthei, "Ancient Systems of International Ethics," 
Classical Quarterly, II, (1908), 248. 
10 Caesar, De Bello GallicoCommentarii, VII, 1, 76 , 77, ed. and 
transl. by John Bond and A.S. Walpole, Macmillan, New York, 
1887. 
11 Cf. ibid., III, 16. 
12 Divus Julius, XXIV, "Nonnulli dedendum eum hostibus censuerlnt." 
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.' populatlons yleldlng themselves submlsslvely or bowlng perforce 
to the new savlours of the world. Both Caesar, the genlus, and 
the freedmen by the Tlber felt that, "It was necessary that Italy 
should be protected against the ever--'t1lt..,eatening invaslons of the 
Germans by a barrler; and lt was also necessary, now that Italy 
had become too narrow for lts population, that a fresh fleld of 
expanslon should be provided elsewhere~~13 
What, then, ls the personal alm of the Gallic Wars? Havlng 
excluded theprobabll1ty of lts belng an ethlcal Justlficatlon of 
the war, there are two maln theorles whlch remain to be consldered 
The first is that Caesar was trying to show that he was acting 
within the letter, if not the spirit of the Constitution when he 
undertook the conquest of Gaul and raised an army Wlthout the 
explicit permission of the Senate.14 The Constltution, it is 
""'" true, was rapldly becomlng an heirloom, but there were some men 
who, llke Cicero, concelved for it an impractical but sentlmental 
affection. The sensibllities of such men, in Caesar's oplnlon, 
, 
must not be too vlolently shocked. The second theory ls that Cae-
ear was trying to augment the glory of his campaigns either in the 
.' 
13 Bryans, C., and Hendy, F., History ~ Roman Republic, (abridge 
from Mommsen), Scribner's, New York, 1899, 393. 
14 Theodor Mommsen, History of Rome, transl. by Dickson; Bentley 
& Son, London, 1875, IV, 605. 
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eyes of posterity, as Norman DeWitt holds,15 or, (as seems more 
probable in view of his selection of Gaul as his p~ovince) in the 
eyes of his contemporaries whom he was anxious to win over to the 
"new Alexander."lS 
Depending on which of the above mentioned aims motivated 
Caesar in the composition of the Commen;aries, it seems that he 
would be inclined to violate some of Cicero's norms more than 
others. In other words, if he wrote to give a legal justification 
of the war, he would be apt to tell more falsehoods and suppress 
truth in order to explain the "independence of home authority 
which its author had allowed himself." l ? If he wrote mainly to 
magnify his own glory, he would be more tempted to use animosity 
and partiality. These defects are not, of course, mutually ex-
clusive but in a matter so complex as this, the following proce-
~ 
dure seems feasible. Assuming first of all that his intention was 
legal justification of the war, we will consider whether or not 
his work conforms to those norms of Cicero whose violation would , 
better secure this aim. Did he, we ask, deliberately misrepresent 
the truth? "Having settled this point of the theSiS, we will then 
assume that personal glory was his aim, and with this in v~ew, 
l5'DeWitt, 342. 
16 Cf. Divus Julius, VII. 
I? W. Warde Fowler, JuliUS Caesar, Putnam's New York, 1902, 129. 
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will attempt to determine whether or not animosity or partiality 
has distorted the veracity of his account. 
But whatever view we take of Caes~r's purpose in writing,18 
this must be constantly remembered. It does not follow because 
his main end is personal, that his work is not worthy of the name 
of history. Antonius says in the De Or*tore that his main purpose 
in walking in the sun is to get exercise, but he also gets the be-
nefit of a sunburn.19 Similarly, it may well be that Caesar has, 
incidentally to his main purpose, left us a valuable history. We 
cannot decide the issue ~ priori. The question is whether or not 
his personal aim has led him to express only the good and not the 
bad, only his successes and not his failures, only his own contri-
butions and not those of others. 
Proceeding, aocordingly, to the first step, let us see if ~ 
Caesar violated Cicero's first law of historical compOSition by 
distorting the facts. Although the best arguments against the 
probability of falsehood are to be sought in the circumstances at' 
18 The question of the date of publication of the Commentaries 
does not seriously affect our thesis. If written in 46;' the 
latest date (because mentioned in the Brutus), the aim would 
probably be that held by DeWitt, or an effort to conciliate 
the remaining Pompeians. If written in 50 (Holmes), or be-
fore 51 (Mommsen) or during the campaigns (Long), the aim 
would be legal Justification of the war. But in any case we 
admit the personal motive. 
19 De Oratore, II, 60. 
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the time of writing and in Caesar's own prudence, it will be help-
ful before developing these pOints, to consider br~efly the four 
20 
main accusations mentioned by T. Rice Holmes. As was said in 
the introduction to this chapter, the,'.uffice to give us an idea 
of the specific oharges of distortion. Holmes' refutation of 
these charges, together with the strong arguments from probability 
'. will lead, we think, to the oommon-sense view that, though the 
Gallio Wars may have been written to Justify the wars of Caesar, i 
was neither expedient nor necessary for him to depart from the 
truth to secure this end. 
With the last part of the previous statement the opponents of 
Caesar's credibility will not agree. In their opinion the writer 
could have seoured his end only by tampering with the truth. Fol-
lowing this conviction their next step is to ask themselves Whal 
lies Caesar would have to tell in order to make the Helvetii and 
Ariovistus the aggressors in the oontests whioh inaugurated the 
Gallic campaign, or in order to give the impression that the Ro-
man general was continually being forced to pursue the war. 
First of all they say that Caesar imputed false motives for 
.. 
the Helvetian migration and that he did not give his own real mo-
tives for attaoking Ariovistus. Caesar and the Romans were afraid 
• 
20 Holmes, 217-29. 
.' 
that the Helvetians were desirous of founding a Gallic Empire, but 
according to Ferrero: 
There were no political designs in their trek 
at all. The real center of political interest 
lay in quite a different drrection. At the 
moment of Caesar's arrival what really endan-
gered Gaul was not the Swiss peril, personified 
in the Helvetian trekkers, but the German 
peril personified in Ariovistus.2l 
'. Yet after thus emphasizing the German peril when discussing the 
Helvetian campaign,22 the same author thinks that Caesar had to 
"improvise" a war against Ariovistus. For "no reasonable pretext 
of war could be alleged against him. "23 In order to prove these 
charges Ferrero used a method which "involved a drastiC recons-
truction of Caesar's First Commentary.M24 Rather than repeat that 
drastic reconstruction which is presented by him in The Greatnesa 
and Decline ~ Rome, criticized by Holmes,25 re-presented by 
Ferrero,26 and recriticized by Holmes,27 it seems more prudent 
... 
to consider the case settled for the present in Caesar's favor. 
21 Guglielmo Ferrero, The Greatness and Decline of Rome~ transl. by Alfred E. Zimmern, Putnam's, NmrYork, 190r, II, F. 
22 The truth of the matter is that Caesar saw there were two 
real dangers and, like the prudent general, diplomat and states 
man that he was, dealt with one of them at a time. •. 
23 Ferrero, 25. 
24 Holmes, 218. 
25 Holmes, MSi~nor Ferrero's Reconstruction of Caesar's First 
Commentary, Classical Quarterl~, III, (1909), 203-15. 
26 Ferrero, iLe Premier Livre desommentaires et Les Critiques 
de M.T. Rice Holmes," Classical Quarterly, IV, (1910), 28-34. 
27 Holmes, "Signor Ferrero on Caesar,' Classical QuarterlY, 
IV, (1910), 239-46. 
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For the impression one gets of Ferrero's prosecution is this. 
Making great use of the potential for the indicativ.e mood,28 and 
acting on the supposition that Caesar had to lie, the historian 
substitutes for whatever Caesar said'~&a happened that which he 
thinks might have happened~ The final result of what may well be 
called 'Ferrero's First Commentary" is a confused drama in which 
. " 
Caesar is making continual mistakes (but succeeding marvelously 
well in spite of them), and in wh1ch the Helvetians go wandering 
around Gaul, not seeking to establish an Empire, but prepar1ng to 
attack Ariovistus and the Germans Who live in the opposite direc-
tion. If Caesar lied, he did so plausibly. But his critic has 
put together a series of actions based on irrational and contra-
dictory motives. Moreover he has succeeded in confusing not only 
his readers but himself as well. We have seen one example of this 
already (where he says that Caesar had to seek a pretext of w~ 
with Ariovistus.) Let us look at two others. 
Discussing the General Assembly of Gaul in 58 B.C., 
Ferrero says: 
28 His text and footnotes aboun~ in such expressions as: Id' it 
not s1mpler to suppose (p. 5); Rauchenstein has shown the 
frobabi11tz that Caesar is mistaken. (3); It seems unlikely 
l5}; What exactly took plaoe we do not know {16}; Very likely 
it was more serious than Caesar wishes us to know. (27). etc. 
(Italics mine.) 
.,' 
It was hardly possible ·to doubt that this gene-
ral assembly seemed in itself to prove, that 
the Helvetian war had done more to inorease Ro-
man prestige in Gaul than a generation of nego-
tiations and senatorial debates.~9 
But in the very next paragraph we rea4~the following: 
••• he realized the full extent of his blunder 
in attaoking the Helvetii ••• This oampaign ••• 
had oompromised the prestige of Rome in Gaul 
and lessened ~Os chances in t~e war against 
Ariovistua ••• 
The second example is even stranger. Ferrero thinks that 
the viotory over the Helvetii which Caesar desoribed3l was no 
victory at all - because he deoided to rest for three days.32 
40 
The obvious question to this is, NIf the Helvetians really won the 
battle, why did they ask for peaoe at the end of that time?· 
That they did ask for peaoe Ferrero does not deny. The following 
is his explanation: 
Tired out by their long maroh, and perhaps 
somewhat bewildered by what had taken plaoe, 
they had suddenly oonceived a fear lest RomS3 might make them pay dear for their viotory_ 
29 Ferrero, 23. 
30 Ibid. " 
31 BiIIum Gallioum, I, 26, 27. Hereafter the abbreviation B.G. 
will be used. .-
32 Ferrero, 17. 
33 Ibid. 
-
r 
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They must have been a strange people! A victory so bewllders 
them that they declde to surrender to the enemy le~t a like event 
again befall them. 
After considering such interpretation of the Gallic War, we 
hold more strongly to the bellef that the susplclon of falsehood 
in statements which were accepted by co,temporaries who were 
competent to judge,~4 ls apt to make us not serious scholars but 
senseless sceptlcs. That Caesar lied is very possible but the 
probability that he did must be proved by better arguments than 
the preceedlng and those which follow. 
The .econd charge to be considered ln thls thesls ls that of 
the German scholar, Rauchenstein~5 who argues that the Helvetians 
could not have attacked Caesar's entrenchments on the Rhone.~6 
According to him, the incldent was invented by Caesar to make bts 
enemy guilty of the flrst attack. We may divide hls reasons for 
denying Caesar's credibility into an argument from probability 
and an argument from authority. 
Rauchenstein's first argument, then, is that the Helvetii 
would not have walted idly from March 28 (the day on which-they 
~4 Cicero, Brutuso 262; Hirtius, B.G., VIII, 35 Rauchensteln, ~ Feldzug Casars-gegen ~. 
51-54, (cited by Holmes, 224). 
~6 B.G., I, 6, 7, 8. 
--
1. 
Helvetier, 1882, 
42 
asked permlsslon to cross the Rhone), untll Aprll 13 (the day on 
which Caesar announced the refusal of thelr reques~), lf they knew 
Caesar was preparlng hls fortiflcations. Our answer to thls ob-
Jectlon ls that the Helvetians dld no,t 'Jmow what Caesar was dolng. 
For according to the aocount of Napoleon III, based on a personal 
37 
examlnatlon of the site by his collaborator, Colnel Stoffel, 
Caesar's entrenchments could have beentuilt unobserved wlthin 
three days. Moreover, neither the account of Caesar nor of Dio 
Cassius38 states that the Helvetlans actually waited a very long 
tlme. The ,charge of Rauchenstein is based then, on two false sup-
positions - that the buildlng of the entrenchments aotually took 
the whole period of fifteen days, and that they oould not be con-
cealed from the enemy. 
Arguing from authorlty, Rauchensteln claims that Caesar lled 
... 
beoause Dl0 Casslus makes no mention of the Helvetlans attemptlng 
to storm the entrenchments. But an argument from another's slleno, 
and partlcularly ln thls case, is no argument agalnst Caesar. 39 
For Casslus was not a mllltary hlstorlan and so was very llkely 
37 Napoleon III, 59 and note; 58-64. •. 
38 Casslus Dl0, Roman History, XXVIII, 32, i, ed. and transl. by 
Ernest Cary, Macmlllan, New York, 1914. 
39 I do not thlnk wlth Holmes (225) that Dio's narrative lmplies 
that they did attack. But lt does not exclude that possibl-
llty either. 
, 
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to exclude or omit such a point, whereas Caesar was the military 
historian par excellence. 
We may take advante~e of this ex~ple to give a general ans-
, ... ; 
wer to those who cite Dio Cassius and Appian as authorities against 
Caesar. They usually do so because the Greek historians often add 
details which are not found in the Roman.s account, but do not 
necessarily contradict him. That is why it may be said, "Dio Cas-
sius is entirely at one with Caesar in his account of the Conquest 
of Gaul."4o The following passa~written by Ernest Cary, editor 
of the Loeb edition of Dio Cassius, would help to avoid a lot of 
useless accusations of Caesar: 
Unfortunately the value of his history is 
grea.tly diminished for us as a result of his 
blind devotion to two theories governing 
historical composition in his day. On the 
one hand .•• mere details should give place to 
the larger aspects and significance of events 
••• On the other hand, the historian was never 
to forget that he was at the same time a rhe-
torician; if the bare facts were lacking in 
effectiveness, they could be adorned, modi-
fied, or variously combined in the interest 
of a more dramatic presentation ••• A good il-
lustration of the transformation the facts 
could undergo in the interests of these two 
theories is seen in his account of the con-
quest of Gaul. It is now generally recog-
nized that there is nothing in this account 
which need imply an ultimate source other 
40 Teuffel-Schwabe, History of Roman Literature, transl. by 
George C. Warr, George Bell, London, 1900, I 335. 
.. 
, 
than Caesar's Commentaries; and yet were it not 
for the familiar names, the reader might readily 
be excused for failing to recognize many of the 
events narrated, to such an extent has Dio shift-
ed the emphasis of the facts and assigned new 
motives while attempting to, .. b:ring into relief 
the contra~ts between the Gallic and the Roman 
character.41 
The same defect is implied in Appian: 
.. According to modern canons of criticism, accura-
cy is the first and indispensable requisite of 
the historian, but it was not so in ancient 
times. General conformity to facts was of 
course necessary, but in most cases the aim was 
to make an interesting book or to furnish a 
setting for the political ideas, or the moral 
principles which he entertained. Appian was 
nei therbetter nor worse in this re~pect than 
the average historians of his time.42 
44 
The third objection, which is simply stated and even more 
simply answered, is based on the following passage from the first 
book: 
Caesari renuntiatur, Helvetiis esse in animo 
per agrum Sequanorum et Aeduorum iter in San-
tonum fines facere, qui non longe a Tolosatium 
finibus absunt, quae civitas est in provincia. 
Id si fieret, intellegebat, magno cum pe~iculo 
provinciae futurum, ut homines bellicosos, po-
pu+i Romani inimicos, locis patentipus maxime-
que frumentariis finitimos haberet.43 
Caesar, it is charged, minimized the distance between the 
.. 
41 Cary, xiii-xiv. 42 Appian, Roman History, I, xi, ed. and transl. by Horace Vfuite, 
Macmillan, New York, 1912, I. 
43 B. G., I, 10. 
, 
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territory of the Santoni and Tolosates in order to make the danger 
seem more threatening to the Roman people. Now si~ce the distance 
is actually one hundred and thirty miles,44 it must be admitted 
that the words n2n longe appear to be.&Yrhetorical exaggeration. 
But if we use a little common-sense, it is obvious that Caesar was 
not asking his readers to take on h1s word alone a fact that they 
• could eas11y prove false themselves. ~ longe meant that s1nce 
there was no m111tary barrier to keep off the restless foe from 
the Roman territory, the enemy was 1n a certa1n and real sens~ near 
to Rome. We might say that a Japanese colony on Hawa1i 1s not far 
from San Francisco. Caesar could argue from the past d1plomat1c 
procedure of the Senate that 1t, too, thought such an enemy to be 
a real threat even if it remained in Gaul. For as early as 60, 
Cicero states in a letter to Atticus that the Senate is sending 
warnings to the Gallio states telling them not to Join the Helvt-
tians who are threatening to attack the province. 45 Whether or 
not Caesar was looking for a war is not the po1nt of this thesis. 
We think that he was and that he had enough foresight to choose 
this province for that very purpose.~ But we think, too, that he 
was prudent enough to wait for a good "incident." 
invasion was an ancient Pearl Harbor. 
The Helvetian 
.. 
44 Holmes, 226. 45 Cicero, Epistulae , Ad. Att. I, 19, 2, ed. by Louis C. Purser, 
, 
Clarendon, Oxford, 1903, II, pars prior. 
46 "Although the actual invasion did not take place till 58 B.C., 
it had been long meditated, and was doubtless expeoted at Rome. 
How,Cicero's Select Letters, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1934, 
II, 88. 
~'~----------------------------------~ 
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The last charge of distortion to be considered by us is that 
the whole rhetorical tone of the Gallic Wars is that Caesar was 
forced to oonquer Gaul. But suoh an impression arises from a 
false opinion of Caesar's purpose in',w»,iting his history. We have 
given suffioient reasons above47 to show that he was not required 
to give an ethical Justification of his war. And what, we ask, in 
.. 
the Gallic Wars is to make us believe that he was attempting to do 
so? Once he undertook to conquer all of Gaul, he was forced from 
~ campaign 1£ another and probably found his work harder than he 
had expected. 48 But did he ever try to prove that he was forced 
to conquer Gaul !n !h! first place? He never attempts to deny the 
Gauls' right to their freedom. Rather he coldly narrates his own 
suppression of the continued rebellions of a struggling race. Re-
call the past history of Gallo-Roman relations and you will see 
why he needed to do no more to win over a Roman. 
The consideration of these four typical charges of unreliabi-
lity in the Commentaries of Caesar have sufficed, we think, to , 
Let us now show us the general nature of particular accusations. 
restate what we said before is the simpler and more convincing 
argument, namely, that it was neither necessary nor expedi'ht for 
47 Cf. pp. 22-23, above. 
48 Holmes, 227. 
47 
.' 
Caesar to lle ln order to prove the legallty of hls actlons. It 
was ~ necessary to lle because after the conference at Lucca hls 
command ln Gaul had been prolonged for flve years, even though he 
had been carrylng on formally unconstl~tlonal wars slnce 58. Se-
condly, the Senate had already decreed unprecedented thanksglv-
lngs49 for hls vlctorles over the Belgae and the marltlme states. 50 
'. Thlrdly, Clcero had glven support to a measure ln the Senate (In 
56) whlch would provlde pay for Caesar's troops (troops ralsed on 
hls own authorlty), and had besldes "pronounced a glowing panegyric 
on his explolts ln Gaul."5l Lastly, we may ask wlth Holmes, I were 
not lllegal and unconstltutlonal acts frequent in those revolution-
ary tlmes?u52 The Constltutlon was dead. Caesar knew that; he was 
looking ahead and could not be too concerned wlth the fact. 
Nor does it seem expedlent for Caesar to have dlstorted the 
... 
truth. His lleutenants could easlly have refuted such evldent 
falsehoods as those with whlch he ls charged. Or ls lt to be 
49 B.G ... II, 35, HOb easQue res ex lltterls Caesarls ln dles 
quTnaeclm suppllcatl0 decreta est, quod ante ld tempus accedlt 
nulll." " 
, 
50 Success was justlflcatlon enough for the Senate provlded the 
general dld not show too many slgns of becomlng one of !ts own 
opponents - as Caesar of course was dolng. But lf the Senators 
wanted to oust hlm, they would have to do so on other grounds 
than the legallty of hls wars. 
51 How, 153. Thls was the speech, ~ Provlnciis Consularlbus. 
52 Holmes, 220. 
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supposed that everyone in the army was in on the secret? That 
would be a rather remarkable sign of unity in days ~hen even trium-
virs watched one another's actions more closely than those of pu-
blic enemies. 
Legal justification of his campaigns may not, however, have 
been Caesar's purpose in writing the Cotmentaries. Perhaps, to use 
a clever distinction of Holmes, this work was not an apology but an 
apo1ogia. 53 With a conquered nation behind him and a civil war a-
head of him, "the next step in the argument is to conclude that 
Caesar did write an account of his conquest of Gaul to reassure his 
friends and to warn his enemies ••• "54 This ls, we think, a most 
probable motlve for the composition of the Gallic Wars. Rostovt-
zeff speaks of the Greek historians of the time who were singing 
the praises ot Pompey.55 Caesar was not going to run the risk of 
~ 
having others ignore his services to the state. Therefore, the 
ambitious general "himself undertook to explain to the Roman people 
the significance of his task in Gau1."56 Now if it is true that , 
this,. and not legal justification, was his main aim in writing, 
we may ask ourselves which of the norms laid down by Cicero would 
e. 
53 Ibid., 229. 
54 newItt, 341. (This is not, however, DeWitt's personal opi-
nion.) 
55 Rostovtzeff, 137. 
56 Ibid., 148. 
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Caesar be more likely to violate. It seems that were he to resort 
to misrepresentation it would be to ignore the last two recommenda-
tions of the orator: Ne quae suspicio gratiae sit in scribendo. Ne 
QUae simultatis.57 Let us see then w~~ther or not Caesar made his 
. ..,.. .. ., 
work so much of an apologia as to be guilty of partiality or 
animosity. 
.. 
Now it is evident that if this discussion is to have any sense 
whatever, we must understand what is meant by the word partial. 
For we are, after all, dealing with an autobiography and unless we 
are content to have Caesar playing a prominent part in his own ac-
counts, even as he did in real life, we are apt to be prejudiced 
from the start. It must be remembered that not everyone speaking 
in his own defense has to be partial. Some men do not have to 
sacrifice truth to gain the end they desire. The only point for us 
A 
to decide in this part of the thesis, then, is whether or not Cae-
sar magnified his own successes beyond their importance. 
Most of the arguments against Caesar's credibility on this , 
score deal with exaggerations of the number of his enemies. Rice 
Holmes considers eight of these charges which impute lies to Caesal 
.. 
57 ~ Oratore, II, 62. 
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out of motives of vanity.58 In aL~ost all of these instances the 
critics are scholars59 who come loaded dovrn with subtle arguments 
from internal arl external evidence to prove the military and 
geographical impossibility of Caesar 'railmi ttedly one of the great-
est strategists of all time) ever having such a large enemy to con-
tend with as he claims. 60 Now although.each of these arglJ.l'l'Ents 
is refuted point for point by Holmes, it is again doubtful whether 
his most telling argument - because so simple and obvious - is not 
the fact that there were certainly many personal enemies of Caesar 
who would be able and anxious to refute the general's testimony, if 
it were so obviously exaggerated. Labienus, for instance, went 
over to Pompey but there is no record of him stating that Caesar's 
records of his ovm accomplishments were false. As a matter of 
fact, if we except the remarks of Suetonius on the criticism of'" 
Asinius Pollio,6l (a criticism which, as it stands, is rather 
58 Holmes, 229-49. 
, 
59 Napoleon (the general) is a critic of Caesar's truthfulness in 
one case. He is, it is true, an adversary of weight but the 
answer of" Holmes (243) seems to be cogent. 
60 Some of the critics are: Rauchenstein, M. de la Borderie~' Ihne, 
Eicheim. 
61 Divus Julius, LVI. If Pollio ASinius, parum diligenter, parumque 
integra veritate compositos, putat, cum Caesar pleraque •••• 
temere crediderit, et ••• perperam ediderit: existimatque, res-
cripturum et correcturum fuisse. 
51 
vague) the Commentaries were considered accurate by the ancients. 62 
There is another simple. argument which because of its practi-
cality is very likely to escape the ~v~r-zealous test-examiner. 
Who can doubt that the conquest of Gaul, told without any embellis 
ments, but simply and vividly, just as it happened, was in itself 
an achievement sufficient to secure for.Caesar the fame and the 
sympathy that he desired? Consider the following passage from 
Duruy: 
But one day news came that he had defeated four 
hundred thousand Helvetii and a hundred and 
twenty thousand Suevi, and then the Belgae and 
Armoricansj another time that he had crossed the 
Rhine, and that he had carried the Roman eagles 
into Britain, the very western extremity of the 
world. And letters of officers and soldiers 
described those terrible struggles in the midst 
of wild countries ••• 63 
Now ask yourself why he should tell lies that could easily be ~­
futed when the Romans for the last seven years had been hearing of 
the conquest of the Gauls, the Germans, ultimigue Brittani? Does 
General Eisenhower have to stretch the facts to win praise for hi' 
own achievements? Would a prudent man dare to do so? Such 
62 Ibid., -De iisdem commentariie Hirtius ita praedicat: 'Ideo 
probantur omnium judicio, ut praerepta, non praebita, facultas 
ecriptoribus videatur.' 
63 Duruy, History of Rome, ed. by J.P.Mahaffy, transl. by M.Rip1ey 
and W. Clarke, ~F. Jewett, Boston, 1883, III, 359. 
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extrlnslc arguments from clrcumstances show that the Commentarles 
are worthy of the trust they have commonly recelveg. 
But besldes belng falr to the let~er ln speaklng of hls own 
deeds, lt ls posslble that Caesar has slnned agalnst the splrlt of 
thls vlrtue by falllng to mentlon the actlons of hls helpers ln th 
great c~mpalgns. Such, however, does n,t seem to be the case. 
exploits of Lab1enus, for example, are frequently mentloned.6~ 
Perhaps they are coldly narrated but thls coldness 1s a character-
ist1c of his style wh1ch applles even to the account of h1s own 
accompllshaents. 65 Brutus' d1rectlon of the naval battle agalnst 
the Venetl is fully descrlbed and at least lmpllcltly pralaed.66 
He often speaks hlghly of the conduct of hls own men ln battle,67 
even though we are perhaps too often reminded that they would dle 
gladly provlded Caesar was looking on. 68 Agaln, speclf1c lnst~ce 
of valor69 are slngled out to show what the general could rely on 
64 B.~., V, 8, 57-58; VI, 7-8; VII, 62, 87. , 
65 THls coldness ls marked, arls1ng from hls obJectlve treatment, 
1.e., his allowlng facts to tell thelr own story wlthout com-
ment." Bond and Walpole, xxxiv. 
66 B.G., III, 7-16. 
67 ibld., V, 8. "Qua ln re admodum fult mllltum virtus lau~anda, 
qui vectorl1s gravlbusque navlgi1s non intermlsso remlgandl 
labore longarum navlun cursum adaequarunt." 
68 Thls 1s true, however. As was stated above (p.22), loyalty to 
one commander was the new slgnlflcance of the Roman army. 
69 Cf. the story of Baculus, VI, 38. • ••• vldet, lmmlnere hostes 
atque ln summo esse rem dlscrimine: caplt arma a proxlmls atque 
ln porta conslstit;" also, the words of the famous standard-
bearer on the Brltlsh coast l IV, 25, "Desll1te ••• mllltea, nlsl 
vultla aqulla. hostlbus proaere: ego certe meum rel publlcae 
atque lmperatorl offlclum praestltero." 
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for his success. The famous holdout of Quintus Cicero against the 
Nervii is not forgotten. 70 Perhaps this is all a rhetorical trick 
to gain sympathy, but the world could use more of this kind of 
rhetoric. At least Caesar was not s09preoccupied with himself that 
he failed to realize the desire of most readers to hear a little 
about someone other than the great commander • 
• 
How honest is he in recounting his own failures? First of al 
it might be asked, "Did he make mistakes?" As a matter of fact 
objective history proves that he did not make too many of them -
except to pardon his own enemies at Rome. Suetonius concludes his 
account of the Gallic campaign with the following: 
••• per tot successus ter, nec amplius, adversum 
casum expertus; 1n Britannia, classe v1 tempes-
tat1s prope absumpta; et in Gal11a, ad Gergovi-
am legione fusa; et 1n Germanorumfin1bus, TitU=l 
rio et Aurunceleio legat1s per 1ne1dias caeeie. 7 
Now although 1t 1s true that he blames this last defeat (which his 
troops experienced in h1s absence)72 on the foolhardiness of a 
general,73 the words with which he announces h1s withdrawal from, 
70 B.Q. V, 52, "Ciceronem pro eJus merito legionemque collaudat; 
centur10nes singillatim tr1bunosque.militum appellat, quorum 
egregiam fu1ss. virtutem testimonio Ciceronis cognoverat'." 
71 D1vus Ju11us, XXV. 
72 B.G., V. 27-38. 
73 ibid., 52. "Quod detr1mentum culpa et temeritate legati sit 
- II acceptum ••• 
-Gergovia, satis ad Gallicam ostentationem minuendam militumque 
animos confirmandos existimans are a weak disguise of the fact 
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that he had been beaten.74 If he were ~ctually interested in cover 
ing up his failure, it would be a poor performance for one who was 
considered one of the finest orators at Rome. Surely his rhetoric 
could have served him to better advantag.. But an example of the 
lengths to which some of his critics will go to accuse him of rhe-
torical intentions, is the interpretation they put on his digres-
sion on the life and customs of the Gauls and the Germans.75 
"Some critics - Germans, it need hardly be said - have insisted 
that the digression was inserted here simply to cover his retreat 
from the eyes of the Roman public: I invaded and I retreated -
these must not stand too close to each other."76 But, granting 
". 
that he did not dilate on his failure, is it not fair to say "it 
was inevitable that some things should be suppressed which would 
give a handle to his enemies at home."77 Provided he did not 
exaggerate his victories as Sulla did,78 it is unnecessary to 
74 Ibid., VII, 53. 
75 Ibid., VI, 11.28. 
76 Fowler, 216. 
77 Ibid., 132. 
78 ~(Sulla) would, for example, have 
at the battle of Sacriportus he lost 
20,000 killed and 8,000 prisoners." 
.' 
his readers believe that 
but 23 men and the enemy 
Ross, 206. 
, 
--
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demand that he write Confessions. 79 
Cicero's last norm for credibility in history is that the 
historian avoid animosity. How does, Caesar observe this norm? If 
.~~ 
the Commentaries were published after Labienus went over to the 
camp of Pompey, that general certainly got more praise than he 
might have eXpected from a less gallan~foe.80 On the other hand, 
if the work was written in view of the Civil War, that fact did no~ 
prevent the author from speaking favorably of Pompey whenever he 
mentions him. Thus, when Caesar asked recruits from Cisalpine 
Gaul, Pompeius et rei publicae et amicitiae tribuisset. 8l Regard-
ing the troubles at Rome in 52, Caesar remarks iam ille urbanas rea 
virtute Gnei Pompei commodiorem in .tatum Bervenisae intellegeret~~ 
Though praised highly for his defense against the Nervii, Quintus 
Cicero is not given a proportionate condemnation for his rashness 
at Aduatuca. 83 And if we may use the negative argument, there are 
no digressions to attack his political enemies. In fact, hardly 
any mention is mad.e of the conditions at Rome except to tell who, 
79 "His enemies were annoyed at his victories, made capital out 
of his defeats, and spread false news ••• " Bond and Wa190le, 
XXXii, note 5. 
80 Cf. note 64. 
81 B7G., VI, 1. 
82 Ibid., VII, 6. 
83 Ibid., VI, 36 " ••• simul eorum per motus vocibus, qui illius 
patientiam paene obsessionem appellabant ..• nullam ejusmodi 
casum expectans ••• " 
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the consuls were in each year of the campaign. Caesar was writing 
a history of the Gallic War, no matter what his motive was in doing 
so. 
~~ 
We are now ready to summarize the discussion of this part of 
the thesis - the conformity of the Commentaries to our first divi-
sion of Ciceronian norms. What, we ask. should be the reasonable 
opinion of the credibility of Caesar's narrative? That a man is 
innocent until proven guilty is one of our most valued principles. 
Therefore, in the absence of cogent testimony to the contrary; in 
the light of reliable (though not absolute) ,testimony to credibili 
ty, we announce as our verdict: Although Caesar's accounts of his 
campaigns against the Gallic and Germanic tribes were written wit 
'subjective interest, they are also an objectively accurate summary 
of an event which held a great significance in the fortunes of 
~ 
Caesar, in the growing Empire of Rome, and in the civilization of 
the West. 
It follows, too, that if the Gallic!!£! are credible histo-' 
ry, they display a characteristic absent in so much of Roman his-
torical compositions up to the period of Caesar and Cicero. In 
.. 
most of the previous work the historians' reliability was vitiated 
by an oratorical purpose. But Caesar did not allow the personal 
motive to give to his work a rhetorical!2n!. Perhaps the ulti-
mate answer to this apparent contradiction may be found in Fowler' 
description of Caesar's character: 
His turn of mind, as has already been pointed 
out was not rhetorical but scientific; it was 
not words or ideals that attracted him, but 
facts and knowledge. In otAs.. words, he did 
not follow the pseudo-Hellenic culture of the 
day but asserted the truly Roman character .•• 
This is visible in his writings which have 
come down to us, which are the exuression in 
the fewest possible words of ~litary, geog-
raphical, and ethnological observations ••• 
And ••• it may be traced in the whole of his 
political work; not only in his steady re-
fusal to deal with ideals and fancies ••• but 
in the actual application of scient~fic knowl-
edge to matters of public concern. 54 
.' 
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Vifhether or not Caesar would stoop to distorting the truth is 
not, however, the question of this thesis. It is quite possible 
that in the composition of the Civil Wars when the political and 
constitutional issues were so involved,85 Caesar might have had 
to use falsehood to secure his end. Fortunately, that does not~ 
concern us now. For the problem of this chapter was not, IIIs 
Caesar a credible historian?" but !tAre the Gallic Wars credible 
history? II 
Having proved the credibility of Caesar's Commentaries, let 
.. 
us proceed to see whether he has provided us with a literary 
8t~ Fowler, 358 
85 How, Appendix 5, liThe Legal Question at Issue between Caesar 
and the Senate," 312-317. 
, 
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history as well, by conforming to those norms or Cicero for his-
torical writing which deal with presentation and style. 
.. 
, 
CHAPTER IV 
THE HISTORICAL ARTISTRY OF THE GALLIC WARS 
Although so llttle of Roman hlst.~1cal llterature was really 
reliable, the recommendatlons of Clcero for attalnlng truth in this 
fleld are comparatlvely brlef. For he was hlmself more concerned 
• wlth an artistlc deflclency whlch, we mlght say, doomed the hlsto-
rlan's work to a llterary mortallty from the very outset. l It may 
be that he dld not recognlze the sclentlflc weakness of prevlous 
Roman hlstory. But at any rate he dld realize that reliabllity was 
the first requlrement for good hlstory. We have trled to show ln 
the preceedlng chapter that the Gal11~ Wars meets hls demands ln 
this regard, elementary as they may be. 
It ls, then, on this foundatlon that Clcero proceeds "to ~ 
build a theory of sclent1fic crit1clsm that would do credlt to any 
modern Unlversity professor. u2 Such an estimate ls, of course, 
, 
exaggerated lf the meanlng ls that we have here a completely ex- I 
pressed theory of hlstory. But the statement may certa1nly be 
1 uThese general chronlcles, treatises for scholastlc 1nstruction 
or manuals for reference, and the whole literature therewlth con-
nected whlch subsequently became very copious ln the Latln lan-
guage also, can hardly be reckoned as be10nglng to artistlc hls-
torlcal composltlon." Mommsen, IV, 604. 
2 Aubrey Gwynn, S.J., Roman Education from Clcero to Qu1nti1ian, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1926, 106. 
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accepted lf lt means that there ls contalned in this passage from 
the De Oratore, ln germ at least, a declaration of the simple re-
quirements of historlcal craftsmanshlp. Although no one wlll deny 
that there have been untold advances fn4;nlstorical methodology 
since the days of the anclents, we must remember that it is the me-
thodology and not so much the ldeal tha\haS been perfected. That 
Clcero's ldeal, for example, was a high one is shown by the follow-
ing passage in whlch his recommendations are summed up by Aubrey 
Gwynn, who uses modern expressions to denote the same suggestlons 
that the Roman critic made so many centuries ago. 
An accurate knowledge of chronology and geogra-
phy, due attentlon to the causes which underlie 
superficlal phenomena, the laws of human psy-
chology, the standards of publlc morality and 
the moral influences of great personalities: all 
these Cicero requires, and his concluding pre-
cept ls a warnlng agalnst too much attentlon to 
llterary ornament. 3 
If it is asked why Clcero's artistic norms are more developed 
than those whlch deal with the scientlfic aspect of the historian's 
task, the probable answer is that the anclents regarded hlstory as, 
belng prlmarily a work of art.' Although we have seen the dangers 
lnvolved in too close an adherence to thls vlew, lt cannot be de-
.' 
nled that the too scientlflc approach can be equally unfortunate. 
3 Gwynn, 106. 
, De Oratore, II, 62; ~ Legibus I, 5; Qulntlllan, 1n!!. Orate 
X, 1, 31. 
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"Occasionally historlans have trled to avold the contamlnation of 
art by sheer dullness l~ their effort'to avold beln~ popular or li-
terary."5 As a llterary critlc Clcero was anxious to avoid such a 
result. As sketched by hlm the rules',Jar artlstic composition may 
be divlded into those treating of historical presentation and 
historical style. 
,. 
In dealing with historical presentatlon l Clcero emphasizes two 
qualities I clarity and what may be called "historical perspective l " 
the latter a gift possessed by very few of Caesar's predecessors. 
Before proceeding to determine to what extent the work of Caesar 
exemplifies these pOints, a reminder is necessary. In his own 
opinlon Caesar was not composing a finlshed history but rather 
commentarli rerum gestarum for the sake of future historians. 6 A 
short explanation of the distlnction between the two will show why 
,.. 
we must keep this fact in mind when applying the Ciceronian norms 
to the Gallic Wars. For these norms are very briefly stated and 
will consequently demand modification to suit the partlcular type 
of history under discussion. 
5 Godolphin.l. xv. 
6 Hirtius, ~.Q., VIII, proem. 
.. 
, 
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Originally commentarii had the technical meaning of being 
notes or memoranda which were given to an historian as material on 
which he could base his more complete work.' Thus Cicero offered 
, . 
commentarii to Lucceius for writing a9 hietory of his famous consul-
ship. But in addltlon to thls purely prelimlnary function, the 
Commentaril were becom1ng 1n Caesarts time a dlstinct literary 
.. 
genre.8 They were not intended to secure a large circulation and 
(except 1n the case of Caesar) they were not wrltten with too great 
an attempt at literary stYle. 9 Thls new kind of history formed a 
sort of mean between the anna11stic method of the Romans whlch slm 
ply grouped all events accordlng to strict chronolog1cal sequence, 
and the more d1fficult but lntel11gent method whlch grouped events 
according to their causal connections. Commentarli were similar 
to the annals ln this respect that they set down the events of 
,.. 
every year separately. But they were not exactly the same because 
"in Caesart s youth ••• the d1stlnctlon was already made that ln the 
composition of res gestae it was not enough to tell what was done, 
sed etiam quo consilio quaque ratione gesta essent." 10 
, 
, Francls W. Kelsey, MThe T1tle of Caesar's Work on the Gallic and 
Civil Wars.· TAPA, XXXVI, (1905), 225. , ., 
8 By way of confirmlng his thesls that Caesar wrote h1s work pure-
ly for the sake of poster1ty, Norman DeW1tt polnts out the simi-
larlty between the l1terary type he chose and the Ephemer1des or 
H7pomnemata of Ptolemy wh1ch recorded the conquests of Alexander, 
"both of whlch terms were to be translated by the Lat1n 
commentar1i,· 345. 
9 Cf. DeW1tt, 346, and Kelsey, 226. 
10 Kelsey,. 233. 
63 
From this distinction between complete history and commentari 
it follows that we must not attempt to make Caesar's work exemplify 
the requirements of Cicero to a greater extent than the latter him-
self would demand. For in drawing Up'ft~ norms it seems that he 
had in view a history which would cover a large span of years. As 
a matter of fact he implies in the De Legibus that he was contem-
plating writing such a history himself. lt This does not mean, how-
ever, that we cannot use the norms expressed in the De Oratore as 
a basis for examining the artistry of the Gallic~. For though 
a universal history or a history of Rome !£ urbe condita would 
give a writer a fuller scope for putting into practice the Cice-
ronian advice,l2 even the writer of Commentaries should be able 
to profit by applying the same rules within the limitations of 
this new literary genre. We will then have an opportunity to see 
that Caesar appreciated the value of Cicero's canons. It was it\' 
fact because he did appreciate them that he "probably without 
11 De Legibus, I, 8. 
12 Hid Caesar devoted himself to writing a universal history, he 
would probably have been most capable of exercising historical 
perspective - at least if we may judge by his ability to note 
trends in Roman politics and foresee the doom of the Constitu-
tion. •. 
, 
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.' realizing it himself, produced a literary masterpiece of the first 
rank. 1113 
It will be helpful before we proceed to the detailed proof of 
this last statement to repeat the co~r&te passage in the De Orato-
~ which deals with the rules for an effective presentation: 
••• ipsa autem exaedificat10 PQs1ta est in rebus 
et verb1s: rerum rat10 ord1nel temporum des1de-
rat, regionum descr1pt10nem; volt et1am, quon1am 
1n rebus magn1s memor1aque d1gn1s cons1l1a pr1-
mum, de1nde acta, postea eventus exspectantur, 
et de cons11i1s s1gnif1cari quid scr1ptor pro-
bet et in rebus gest1s declarar1 non solum qu1d 
actum aut d1ctum s1t, sed et1am quo modo, et cum 
eventu d1catur, ut causae exp11cantur omnes vel 
casus vel sap1ent1ae vel temer1tat1s;hom1numque 
1psorum non solum res gestae, sed et1am, qu1 fa-
ma et nomlie excel1ant, de cuJulque v1ta atque 
natura ••• 
In stat1ng h1s f1rst rule, rerum rat10 ord1nem temporum del1-
derat, reg10num descr1pt10nem C1cero 1s emphas1z1ng, we th1nk, 
~ 
that quality wh1ch 1s of the greatest necess1ty 1n any kind of wr1-
t1ng. C1ar1ty manifests 1tself 1n various ways in the var10us 
k1nds of l1terature. Thus in a speech 1t would be probably most 
exerc1sed 1n the transit10n from one argument to another, or 1n 
the prec1se"statement of one's own case as opposed to that of the 
.. 
, 
13 Kelsey, 219. So, although the words of W1ght Duff, lithe annal-
1st1c ~ethod wh1ch culm1nated in Caesar" are true 1n the1r con-
text, \p. 417) they are apt to be a little mislead1ng. Even 
were we to presc1nd trom the style ot the GalliC Wars (of wh1ch 
more later), the work is far super10r to anything the anna11sts 
ever produced.· 
14 De Oratore, II, 16. 
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adversary; in drama, in the steady development o~ an intricate 
plot or delineation o~ character; in a treatise on rhetoric, ~or 
example, in the orderly division o~ the topics to be treated, all 
.9 .. ., 
in their appointed order. In history which o~ten treats o~ events 
long past or in regions un~amiliar to the reader, it would come 
most into play in presenting a clear c~onological and topological 
picture o~ the events to be narrated. 15 More than this o~ course 
is demfuided o~ the historian but this, at least, is essential. For 
Crassus t words resarding the necessity o~ clearness is the speech 
may be applied to the composition o~ history as well. "We cannot 
hope that he who cannot make us understand what he says, will make 
us adrnire what he says."16 But despite the ~act that clarity is 
a sine qua ~ in writing, there may be various grades o~ excel-,.. 
lence in obtaining this essential objective. Let us see then how 
Caesar has succeeded in presenting the ordinem temporum and regio-
num descriptionem in a typical instance - the expedition against , 
the Helvetians which is related in the First Commentary.17 
.' 
15 This is not the only application o~ clarity in history, but it 
is, we thiru{, the chie~ one. 
16 De Oratore, III, 38. "Neque sperare possumus eum qui non dicat 
quod intelligamus hunc posse quod admiremur dicere." 
17 In the ~ollowing paragraphs the italicized expressions repre-
sent temporal re~erences ~ound in Caesar's text. 
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.' At the beginning of the book the narrow boundaries of Helvetia 
are accurately described,18 and we are told that th~ Gauls f1rst 
conceived the idea of emigratlng from them when Messalla and Marcus 
~ consuls.19 They thought that twe'~ears would be sufficlent 
for the preparat10ns,20 and declded on the route through the Roman 
province because the Rhone was easily fordable there,2l whereas the 
route which ran between the Jura range ind the river could easily 
be blocked against them. 22 Accordingly, 1n !h! consulship of Lu-
cius Piso and Gabinius they' were ready to move and agreed to meet 
at the banks of the Rhone on March 28. 23 Hearing of the movement, 
Caesar hastened to the mustering place and delayed his answer to 
the Helvetian request for free passage through the Roman territo-
ry.24 He spent the intervening time by destroy1ng the brldge at 
Geneva,25 and by building an entrenchment from the Lake ot Geneva 
18 ~.Q., I, 2. " ••• undlque locl natura Helvetll continentur: una el 
parte flumlne Rheno altlsslmo, qul Agrum Helvetlum a Germanls 
dlvldlt, tertla lacu Lemmano et flumlne Rhedano, qul est lnter 
Sequanos et Helvetlos, altera ex parte monte Iura altlsslmo, 
qul provlnclam nostram ab Helvetlls dlvldlt." 
19 Ib1d., " .•• M. Messalla et M. Plsone consullbus." 
20 Ibid., 3, "Ad eas res conficiendas biennlum satls esse duxe-
runt ••• " 
, 
21 Ibid., 6; " ••• lnter fines Helvetlorum et Allobrogum ••• Rhodanus 
flult lsque nonnullis locls vado transltur." 
22 Ibid., " ••• mons autem altlssimus impendebat, ut facile perpaucl 
prohlbere iossent." 
23 Ibid., 6, Is dies erat a.d. V. Kal. Apr. L. Pisone, A. Gabinio 
consulibus." 
24 Ibid., 7, " ••• legatis respondit, dlem se ad deliberandum sump-
turum: sl quid vellent, ad Id. April. reverterentur." 
25 ~., "Pontem, qui erat ad Genevam, iubet resclndl." 
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.' to the Jura mountains. 26 On April 13 he finally refused the re-
quest to pass through the province. 27 After a vain attempt to 
force the passage ot the Rhone, the Helvetians withdrew and decide 
to go out of thelr territorr by the ~\ernate route - through the 
land ot the Sequani. 28 Caesar hurried back to Italy, enrolled two 
legions and began his march back over the Alps to pursue the Helve 
tian host. In the land of the Ceutrone' hls path was blocked by 
the Gallic tribes, but only for a short time. For defeating them, 
he arrived ~ ~ seventh day in the land ot the Vocontii ln Fur-
ther Gaul. From that point he easl1y proceeded to the country of 
the Segusiavi, the first tribe across the Rhone. 29 !l lh1! !!!! 
the Helvetians had reached the land of the Aedui. 30 At the lat-
ter's request Caesar deeided to attack the invaders. ~ three-
fourths of the Helvetians had crossed the Saone, wh1ch separates 
the territorJ of the Aedui from that of the Seguani,31 Caesar~am 
26 ~., 8. I ••• a lacu Lemanoo, qui in flumen Rhodanum 1nfluit, 
ad montem Juram ••• mi11a passuum decem novern murum ••• fossamque 
perducit. 1t 
27 (P.44) Ibid., IUb1 ea dles, quam constiterat ven1t .•• negat se.( 
iter ••• dare. 
28 ~., 9, "Relinquebatur una per Sequanos via." Th1s had pre-
viously been described as " angus tum et d1ff1cile, inter montem 
Iuram et flumen Rhodanum, vix qua singuli carri ducerentur ••• " 
Ibid. I 5. .. 
29 Ibld., 10, • ••• in f1nes Vocont1orum ulter1or1s provinclae die 
sept1mo pervenit; 1nde in Allobrogum f1nes, ab Allobroglbu8 ln 
Seguslavos exercitum ducit. Hl sunt extra provinc1am trans 
Rhodanum prlml." 
30 ~., 11, "Helvet1l lam ••• ln Aeduorum fines pervenerant.' 
31 Ibid., 12~.·Flumen est Arar, ~uod ~er flnes Aeduorum et Sequa-
norum 1n nnodanum lnflult ••• UD1 ••• 0aesar certlor factus est, 
tres Jam partes ••• 1d flumen traduxlsse ••• de tertla v1g111a cum 
legionibus tribus e castr1s profectus ad eam partem perven1t 
dum f um n tran 1erat." 
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upon the remalnlng quarter In the thlrd watch an~ routed It. 
Transferrlng hls army over the Saone ln ~ day - ,n operatlon 
whlch had taken the enemy twenty days to complete32 he scared the 
Helvetlans lnto sendlng deput1es. The~,refused the Romans' terms 
however and moved thelr camp Qn ~ followlng day.33 Caesar pur-
sued ~ about a fortnlght. 34 
Meanwhl1e Caesar was trying to get the corn promlsed by the 
Aedul because lt was only early sprlng~O After learnlng that Dum-
norlx, the Aeduan, was causlng the delay and had also been the 
cause of Caesar's cavalry retreatlng ! few days before,36 he se-
cured hlmse1f agalnst further trouble from that source. On the 
!!!! day the enemy came up close to the Roman camp,37 and Caesar 
told Lablenus to selze a helght overlooklng, the enemy. The latter 
lett at lh! thlrd watch and Caesar hlmself advanced in the fourAh 
32 Ibld., 13, " ••• cum ld, quod lpsl dlebus xx aegerrlme confece-
rant, ut f1umen translrent, 111um uno dle teclsse lntel1egeren~ 
legatos ad eum mlttunt." , 
33 Ibld., 10, 'Postero dle castra ex eo loco movent •.• " 
34 Ibld., "Ita dles clrclter qulndeclm lter tecerunt ••• • 
35 Ibld., 16, Interlm cotldle Caesar Aeduos frumentum ••• flag1tare. 
Nam propter frlgora, quod Gallla sub septentrlonlbus, ut ante 
dlctum est, poslta est, non modo frumenta ln agrls matu~a non 
erant, sed ne pabu11 quldem satls magna copla suppetebat ••• • 
36 I2!S., 18, ·Reperlebat etlam ••• quod proe11um equestre adversum 
paucis ante dlebus esset factum ••• " 
37 Ibld., 21, ·Eodem dle •.• certlor factus, hostes sub monte con-
sedlsse ml1la passuum ab lpslus castrls octo ••• • 
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watch. 38 At ~ Lablenus had taken the helght and Caesar had 
come up to w1th1n a mlle of the enemy.39 But afte~ hls plan had 
fa11ed because of a blunder of one of h1s trusted 11eutenants, the 
Helvetlans shlfted camp ~ the day ~ ~ spent. 40 Caesar 
followed £n the ~ dal4l and pltched hls own camp three ml1es 
d1stant. On !a! morrow42 he ceased h1s pursu1t and turned towards 
.-Blbracte, wh1ch was elghteen m11es away because he had only two 
days corn supply. Th1nking the retreat a detour, the enemy turned 
to attack hlm. In a flerce battle that lasted !£2m !n! seventh 
~ to eventlde, the Romans were vlctorious,43 The surviv1ng 
Helvet1ans marched all through the n1ght and cont1nuously for the 
~ three days,44 tlll they reached the land of the Llngones. 
After ~ three dayS' 1nterval Caesar started agaln ln pursu1t. 45 
The Helvet1ans could stand no more. The1r envoys came w1th terms 
of surrender and the threat to Rome was a thlng of the past. 
38 Ibld., 'De tert1a vlgl11a Tltum Lablenum ••• summum lugum montls 
ascendere lubet ••• Ipse de quarta v1g1l1a .•• ad eos contendlt ••• • 
£9 ~., 22, 'Prlma luce, cum summus mons a Lableno teneretur, 
lpse ab hostlum castrls non longlus mll1e et qu1ngentls passl-
bus abesset ••• 1 
40 Ibld., 'Multo denlque d1e ••• Caesar cognovlt ••• Helvetlos castra 
- It movlsse •• -. 
41 Ibld., lEo dle, quo eonsuerat lntervallo, hostes sequltqr ••• 1 
42 ~., 23, "Postrldle e~us diel ••• lter ab Helvetlls avertlt ac 
Blbracte lre eontend1t. 
43 ~., 26, 'Nam hoc toto proe110, cum ab hora septlma ad ves-
perum pugnatum slt ••• 1 
44 Ib1d., lEx eo proell0 elrclter mllla homlnum cxxx superfuerunt 
eaque tota noete contlnenter lerunt: nullam partem noctls lt1-
nere 1ntermlsso 1n f1nes Llngonum dle quarto pervenerunt, cum 
et propter vulnera mll1tum et propter sepulturam occlsorum 
nostr1 trlduum moratl eos sequl non potu1ssent. 1 
45 Ibld. 26,"Ipse trlduo 1ntermlsso cum omnlbus coplls eos sequl." 
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.' In the preceedlng paragraphs we have emphaslzed the temporal 
references found ln the report of the Helvetlan Campalgn, and have 
clted only those geographlcal references whlch would make the shor 
summary lntelllglble and at the same .time sufflce to exempllfy the 
•• 
clarlty of Caesar's narratlve ln thls regard. But hls own des-
crlptlons of the country are fuller and more frequent, although 
they may stlll be consldered brlef and~ven cryptlc. Besldes the 
famous Gallla est omnls dlvlsa ln partes tree and the general des-
crlptlon of Gaul whlch !ollows,46 there are other numerous des-
crlptlons of partlcular reglons, e.g. of Helvetla47 and the varlou 
camp sltes48 whlch must be clearly plctured by the reader who de-
slres an lntelllgent understandlng of the battles. References to 
the Rhlne glve us an lmpresslon of lts psychologlca149 and geo-
graphlca150 lmportance as a barrler between two great races. 
46 Ibld., I, 1. 
47 Cf., n. 18 above. 
48 ~G., I, 38, "Namque omnlum rerum, quae ad bellum usul erant, 
summa erat ln eo oppldo facultas, ldque natura locl slc munle-
batur, ut magnum ad ducendum bellum daret facultatem, propter-
ea quod flumen Dubls ut clrclno clrcumductum paene totum op-
pldum cinglt; rellquum spatlum, quod est non ampllus pedum mll-
le sexce~torum, qua flumen lntermlttlt, mons contlnet magna 
altltudlne, lta, ut radices montls ex utraque parte rlpae 
flumlnls contlngant. Hunc murus clrcumdatus arcem effl~lt 
et cum oppldo conjunglt. N Cf. also, II, 5, 8, 29; III, 1. 
49 Ibld., IV, 16, " ••• cum vlderet Germanos tam faclle impelli, 
ut in Galliam venirent, suis quoque rebus eos timere volult, 
cum intellegerent et posse et audere popull Romanl exercltum 
Rhenum transire." 
50 Ibid., NPopuli Romani imperlum Rhenum flnire: si se lnvlto 
Germanos in Galllam transire non aequum existimaret, cur sul 
qulcquam esse imperil aut potestatls trans Rhenum postularet?" 
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.' There are good descr1pt10ns of the land of Br1ta1n51 (1nclud1ng 
one of the wh1te c11ffs of Dover)52 wh1ch are acc~ate enough, 
cons1der1ng the 11m1tat10ns of anc1ent geography.53 As a matter 
of fact, w1th a reasonably good map to'#1d the eye, the Gal11c 
~ compr1ses one of the eas1est h1gh-sohool texts to follow. 
Caesar has all but thrust a teach1ng dev1ce 1nto the 1nstruc-
tor's hand. We th1nk, then, that C1cer~ would adm1t that the 
recommendat10n he g1ves 1n the Orator when speak1ng of h1story, 
1n qua ••• reg10 saepe aut pugna descr1b1tur,54 was more than suf-
f1c1ently exemp11f1ed 1n Caesar's work. 
We may perhaps best sum up our remarks on the .bronolog1cal 
and topolog1cal clar1ty of the Gal11c Wars by rem1nd1ng the read 
er that 1t 1s one of the most famous m1l1tary h1stor1es of all 
t1me. Th1s expla1ns 1ts pecu11ar attract10n for the Emperor 
Napoleon, and the interest wh1ch was taken 1n 1t by the strate-
g1sts of all t1me and espec1ally dur1ng the fifteenth and 
51 Ibid., V, 11, 12, 13. 
52 Ibid., IV, 23. 
53 H.J. Edwards, 606. 
54 Orator, 66. 
• 
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sixteenth centuries. 55 Clearly it would never have gained such 
a reputation had not its author payed very close attention to 
details of terrain and to the order of time. For the world's 
.9 ... 
fate has often been decided by the action of a moment. Being a 
soldier, it is precisely in his battle descriptions that Caesar 
shows such a marked superiority to the .est of Roman historians -
successors as well as predecessors. Livy becomes strangely obs-
cure in too many of his military accounts, because he had only 
the scholar'S acquaintance with them. Duff says that his "batt1e-
pieces are those of an artist, not of a soldier. They entertain 
rather than instruct."56 We think that to Livy rather than to 
Caesar, apply the following words of Ferrero: 
.•. he gives minute and coloured descriptions 
of battles and sieges, to please the peaceful 
burgher in Italy, who enjoyed, as men in a 
peaceful and settled society always will en-
joy, letting his imagination roam at leisure 
over scenes of fighting and adventure, as he 
turned the pages lazily over in the comfort-
able seclusion of his frescoed veranda.57 
Here at least is a clear instance in which we may judge of Fer-
rero's ability to appraise the work of Caesar, and our estimate 
• 
55 DeWitt, IICornrnentarii de Cornrnentariis Caesaris,1I Classical 
Bulletin, XVIII, (1941), 9. 
56 Duff, 657. 
57 Ferrero, II, 162. 
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.' is not too favorable. For if we may make use of a variation on 
the words of Duff, the almost universal opinion of Caesar as a 
military historian would be as follows: "Caesar's battle-pieces 
are those of an artist Y. well.!! of',J!.'..nS0ldier. They entertain 
and instruct." In this respect Caesar is to Livy as Xenophon 
was to Thucydides. 58 Both Xenophon and Caesar were experienced 
soldiers who added to the ability of gr\sPing the significant 
details of terrain and time during the heat of battle, an equal-
ly remarkable facility in setting forth these details vividly 
and intelligently for the amateurs who would read their accounts. 
It is this Caeserian characteristic - one that was his both as a 
soldier and as an opponent of the over-rhetorical style in his-
tory - which distinguishes the Commentaries from the work of 
either Dio Cassius or Appian, as the more reliable report of the 
Gallic campaign. The latter historians, through their efforts~o 
please, confused the accounts of their main source, though all 
they had to do was copy its careful attention to topological and 
temporal details which means so much in a military history.59 f 
58 Godolphin, XXXii, "When Xenophon criticizes the tactics of 
strategy 'of the commanders he is usually on solid ground; 
when he describes manoeuvers, the lucidity and intelligibility 
of his style is in pleasing contrast to the complex and often 
obscure mode of expressions adopted by Thucydides." 
59 For an estimate by a professional soldier of the military va-
lue of the Gallic Wars, ~. Oliver Spaulding, "The Ancient 
Military Writers, "-crissical Journal, XXVIII, (1932-3) 
74 
4" 
But the Gallic Wars owes its popularity to other merits than 
clarity. Roger Cram is more than correct when he says, "I submit 
that military history and military science of antiquity are not 
very exciting reading, especially for .. the high-school students. u60 
... 
Were strategic accuracy the only, or even the chief, recommenda-
tion of the Commentaries, it would be hard to explain why by the 
middle of the nineteenth century in Ame'ica "Caesar had joined 
Cicero and Vergil to form the inescapable triumvirate ••• of secon-
dary school study.u6l As a matter of fact, writing a useful mi-
litary account was only incidental to Caesar's main purpose. 62 
There is a more humane significanoe to the history of the Gallic 
campaigns. This, we think, is due to the conformity of the work 
with the other Ciceronian norms of historical presentation -
those that deal with the designs and methods and results of the 
actions described, and with the characters which play prominent~ 
parts in the drama. To these pOints we shall now turn our atten-
tion. 
60 Roger Cram, "Caesar and the Present, II Classical Bulletin, 
XI X , ( 1943), 25. 
61 DeWitt, Commentarii, 9. 
62 "Caesar, qualified to deal with Hannibal on equal terms,· gave 
us involuntarily a valuable military work, whereas he himself' 
looked upon it rather as historical and political." 
Spaulding, 662. 
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.' Although Cicero would probably not object to a historian 
merely recording events of mlnor signlflcanc~, he conslders lt 
his clear duty when dealing wlth signlficant happenlngs to take 
the reader "behind the scenes" by sho.rag him the why and where-
fore of that slgnificance. 63 The flrst step ln this dlrectlon 
is to polnt out the designs or plans of the human lnstruments 
• who turned the course of events into thelr different channels. 
As an example of Caesar's observance of this canon, let us take 
the account of the campaign against Arlovistus. 64 For if the 
author's purpose was to Justify his war from a legal standpoint, 
here, if any place he would be interested ln depicting both his 
own designs and those of his enemy. Moreover, he attains his 
end by a method that is particularly skillful - a speech of 
Divitiacus, the Aeduan. It was delivered before Caesar at the 
Gallic convention which followed the defeat of the Helvetians, ~ 
and had for its purpose the securing of the conqueror's aid 
against the German lnvader. Whether or not the speech was ac-
tually delivered by the Gaul does not concern us now. This de-
vice was a convention in anclent history-writing and dld not 
necessarily entall falsehood. 
• 
63 ~e Oratore, II, 61. "Quonlam in rebus magnls memoriaque 
dignls, consllla primum, deinde acta, postea eventus exs-
pectantur ••• " 
64 g.G. It 31-47. 
f 
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The speech begins with a brief description of the political 
situation in Gaul - a two-party system which was the occasion of 
Ariovistus I intervention to "help" the Sequani. 65 In the course 
of the speech we have the suggestion 0' '~wo of the reasons for 
Caesar I s decision to interfere on behalf of the Gauls. Ther are 
the danger of further German advances across the Rhine, 66 and the 
threat of a general migration of all the·Gauls,67 similar to that 
of the Helvetians which Caesar had just succeeded in halting. By 
the concluding sentence of the speech: 
Caesarem vel auctoritate sua atque exercitus 
vel recenti victoria vel nomine populi Roma-
ni deterrere posse, ne maior multitudo Germa-
norum Rhenum traducatur, Galliamqu~80mnem ab 
Ariovlsti injuria posse defendere. 
Caesar shows that this is no petty quarrel with a German prince 
but a conflict upon whose outcome will depend the subjection of 
65 Ibid., 31. "Locutus est pro his Divitiacus Aeduus: Galliae 
totius factiones esse duas: harum alteriusprincipatum tene-
re Aeduos, alterius Arvernos. Hi cum tantopere de potentatu 
inter se multos annos contenderent, factum esse, uti ab ~ver­
nis Sequanisque Germani mercede arcesserentur ••• '" 
66 Ibid., "Futurum esse paucis annis, uti omnes ex Galliae finibus 
pellerentur atque omnes Germani Rhenum transirent ••• " 
67 Ibid., IINisi si quid in Caesare populoque Romano sit aweilii, 
omnibus Gallis idem esse faciendum quod Helvetii fecerint, ut 
domo emigrent, aliud domicilium, alias sedes, remotas a ~erma­
nis, petant fortunamque, quaecumque accidat, experiantur," 
68 Ibid. 
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all Gaul to the German or the Roman empire. Now that the war 
has taken on a fuller significance we are prepared when, a few 
paragraphs later, Caesar explicitly enumerates his own reasons 
for engaging Ariovistus. The first is·xhat the Aedui are 
·9 ... 
"friends" of the Roman people,69 according to an official sena-
torial decree. Secondly, the frequent crossing of the Rhine by 
the Germans was not a good omen for the~oman state. 70 Lastly, 
Ariovistus had committed the unforgivable sin in the eyes of 
the Romans - forgetting the dignity of their name. 71This, then, 
was the meaning72 of the war with Ariovistus. 
Similarly the plan of the emigrating Helvetians is clearly 
stated - to show that the movement was no mere domestic concern 
but an international problem. Dumnorix, according to Caesar, 
hoped to unite with the Aedui and the Seguani in securing the 
69 Ibid., 33. MEt secundum ea multae res eum hortabuntur, quare 
sibi eam rem cogitandam et suscipiendam putaret, 1mpr1mis, 
quod Aeduos, fratres consanguineosque saepenumero a senatu 
appellatos, in serv1tute atque in dic10ne videbat •.• tener1 •.• 
70 Ibid., "Paulat1m autem Germanos coneueecere Rhenum trans1re, 
et 1n Galliam magnam eorum multitudinem venire, populo Romano 
periculosum videbat ..• u 
71 Ib1d., "Ipse autem Ar10vietue tantos sibi spiritus, tantam 
arrogantiam sumpserat, ut ferendus non videretur." • 
72 Meaning, we think, 1s a Justifiable interpretation of the 
word, consilia, in the text of Cicero. By learning the plans 
of the persons engaged in the actions, we come to know the 
s1gnif1cance of those actions. 
, 
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mastery of all Gaul.73 Nor was it only Rome's hopes to the 
domination of Gaul that were threatened, but Her very security 
was being weakened. For Caesar had heard that the Helvetians 
intended to march through the land o~ibe Sequani and Aedui into 
that of the Santones, who were not far from Toulouse in the 
Roman province.74 
vVhat, finally, is the significance of the various rebellions 
recounted in the course of the Commentaries? The statement 
which gives the reason for the Belgian conspiracy~ 
ita populi Romani hiemare exercitum atque in-
veterascere in Gallia moleste ferebant ••• 7~ 
the suspicions of the Veragri and Seduni during the campaign of 
the year 56 that: 
Romanos non solum itineru:m causa, sed etiam 
perpetuae possessionis culmina Alpium occu-
pare conari 75 ea loca finitimae provinciae 
adiungere ••• 
the hope of the maritime states: 
in ea libertate quam a maioribus acceperint 
permanere quam Roman 0 rum servitutem per-
ferre. 77 
• 
73 B.G., I, 3. IIHac oratione adducti inter se fidem et iusiuran-
dum dant et regno occupato per tres potentissimos ac firmis-
simos populos totius Galliae sese potiri posse sperant. 1I 
74 B. G., I, 10. 
75 B.G., II, 1. 
76 B~G., III, 2. 
77 Ibid., 8. 
79 
.e' 
and numerous other instances make it clear that the Gallic con-
test is one between a people struggling for their freedom and a 
powerful state which is greedy of empire. If the reader fails 
.... to get that impression while reading of the various battles and 
journeys of Caesar's army, it is not the historian's fault.78 
Cicero was definitely thinking of t~e annalistic method 
which characterized so much of the Roman history-v~iting before 
his time, when he stated the norm to be considered next. The 
annals were often little more than catalogues of deeds and 
names, but to suit him, the historian must not tell only what 
was said or done but ~ it was said or done.79 Now was Caesar 
any better than his predecessors in this regard? We have already 
mentioned the importance of his work as a military text-book 
78 The added recommendation of Cicero that the historian tell 
what plans he approves and disapproves is one of those that 
has to be modified according to the type of work under con-
sideration. Since the Gallic Wars is autobiographical, there 
is no need of Caesar telling what plans he approves. Naturally 
he approves of his own and disapproves of those of his enemies. 
But provided that the designs are stated, we have no complaint. 
It is besides far from clear whether or not history profits 
from this moralistic interpretation of which Cicero speaks 
and of which the Romans were so fond. 
79 De Oratore, II, 61. Itvult etiam ••• in rebus gestis declarari 
non solum quid actum aut dictum sit, sed etiam quo modo ••• 1f 
80 
because of its detailed descriptions of battles. The reality 
of his conquest is increased for the reader by frequent passages 
like the description of the British war-chariots,80 the besieg-
ing of the Gallic fortifications,8l and the palisades at Ale-9* 
sia. 82 He was not content to tell us that he crossed the Rhine 
but gave a full engineer's report of the bridge which he built 
for that purpose. 83 Such details alone· would make the work far 
more than the mere listing of the number of his enemies and the 
bold account of his victories. More important, however, is the 
success with which Caesar has fulfilled this norm of telling 
guo modo quid actum aut dictum !1! by the general impression 
whimh the reader gets from the work A! A whole. The author was 
not, as a matter of fact, too interested in telling the Romans 
that Gaul was conquered. They all knew that. But he was par-
ticularly interested in telling them that Gaul was conquered 
through the speed and statesmanship of the Roman commander. 84 
So often does the word celeritas occur in the Commentaries,85 
80 B.Q. IV, 33. 
81 ~.G. VII, 22. 
82 Ibid., 72. 
83 B.G., IV, 17. The passage is a difficult and concise bi~ of 
Latin and shows Caesar's skill in handling the language. 
84 Edwards, xii, xiv. 
85 B.Q., I, 10,13,38,54; II, 3.12; III, 29; IV, 14; V, 11. 
, 
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.' that he who misses this point in the history of Caesar misses 
the secret of his success not only in the conquest of Gaul but 
in the Civil War as well. 8S 
After the historian has shown tht --Significance of the va.-
rious actions and the method by which these actions were carried 
out, it remains for him to state the retults of those actions. 
And in so doing, he is to explain whether the results are the 
work of chance, foresight, or recklessness, to mention a few 
possibilities. 8? Now it is obvious that the conquest of Gaul 
was portrayed by Caesar as the result of his singular foresight, 
and it would take too long to cite the references by whioh he 
manages to keep ~his prominently before the reader's mind. But 
were there not other causes whioh contributed to the conquest of 
Gaul? Why did Caesar's enemy fail to achieve a result propor-
tionate to its courage? Can we find the answer to this in the 
Commentaries? Some, at least, of the reasons are stated, though 
not explicitly. First of all, the Gauls had to contend with a 
great general and a great statesman. Secondly, they were being 
8S "But Pompey's plan of oampaign, though excellent, was unsuc-
cessful. His failure was mainly due to the astonishing acti-
vity, speed, and resoluteness of his rival. 1I 
Rostovtzeff, II, 141. 
8? ~ Oratore, II, 61. "vult etiam ••• et cum eventu dicatur, ut 
causae explicantur omnes vel casus vel sapientiae vel teme-
ri tat is ••• It 
f 
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\ led against an equally brave but better disciplined army. Third 
and most important of all, the Gauls were a fickle people and 
despite all their courage, they could never hold on long to one 
course or pOlicy.88 If we seek then .the causes for the conquest 
•• 
of Gaul, the answer is had in the generalship of Caesar, the 
courage of his army, and the weak (but not cowardly) character 
of his foe. 
By considering the accounts of a few of the battles, we may 
see that Caesar put into practice the Ciceronian principle of 
stating causes in the minor incidents of his work as well. For 
instance, he blames the defeat of Titurius and Cotta on the 
temerity of the former in leading the army out of camp on the 
mere word of the enemy.89 When relating the attack of the 
~ 
88 ~.Q. IV, 5. Est enim hoc Gallicae consuetudinis, uti et via-
tores etiam invitos consistere cogant, et quid quisque eorum 
de quaque re audierit aut cognoverit, quaerant, et mercatores 
in oppidis vulgus circumsistat quibusque regionibus veniant 
quasque ibi res cognoverint, pronuntiare oogant. His rebus 
atque auditionibus permoti de summis saepe rebus consilia , 
ineunt, quorum eos in vestigio poenitere necesse est, cum 
incertis rumoribus serviant et plerique ad voluntatem eorum 
ficta respondeant." 
Cf. also B.G. IV, 13. " ••• et cognita Gallorum infirmitate, 
quantum iam apud eos hostes uno proelio auctoritatis essent 
conseout1, sentiebat." 
89 B.G., V, 52. " ••• quod detrimentum culpa et temeritate legati 
sit aoceptum, hoc aequiore animo ferendum dooet ••• " 
83 
Sugumbri on Quintus Clcero, he blames hls lleutenant for care-
lessness ln sendlng men out to forage ln dangerous clrcumstance~ 
but he goes to great lengths to ascrlbe the defeat to fortune -
or accldent, as we would interpret it~~O The first dlvlslon of 
the Helvetlans to suffer defeat at the hands of Caesar was the 
canton of the Tlgurlnl whlch had once slaln Plso, a relatlve of 
hls. But he dld not clalm to have fore\een the fittlngness of 
thls retrlbutlon. Instead he slmply says that lt bad come about 
elther through chance or by the provldence of the immortal 
gods. 9l 
It is evident from Cicero's last norm for historical pre-
sentation that he does not wish events to be narrs.ted imperso-
nally as though they happened independently of the characters 
involved. For he says explicitly that the life and manners of 
the main characters, at least, are to be described. 92 And on 
this score, too, Caesar must receive our favorable vote. Al-
though he is himself the most prominent character in the Gallic 
Wars, he is careful not to pass over the signiflcance of his 
90 B.Q., VI, 42. " ••• multum fortunam in repentino hostium adven-
tu potuisse iudicavit." 
91 ~.Q., I, 12. "Ita sive casu sive consill0 deorum immortalium, 
quae pars civitatis Helvetiae insignem calamitatem populo 
Romano lntulerat, ea princeps poenas persolvit." 
92 ~ Oratore, II, 61. "hominumque ipsorum non solum res gestae, 
sed etiam, qul fama et nomine excellant, de cujusque vita 
atque natura ••• II 
f 
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opponents. We have already spoken of his descriptions of the 
Gallic character as a contributing cause to their ultimate de-
feat. There are besides frequent references to their curiosity9 
and skill in imitation.94 The sixth ~o~k contains the famous 
comparison between the Gauls and the Germans. 95 How often does 
Caesar attribute the decline of Gaul to the infiltration of 
traders,96 and the supremacy of the Rhi~-dwelling tribes to the 
proximity of the Germans who kept their neighbors in a hardy 
spirit by the constant threat of invasion?97 His account of the 
character of the Nervii is a sample of his procedure when pre-
paring to report another conquest of his more difficult ene-
mies. 98 Another example is the two paragraph passage devoted to 
the customs of the Suebi, Who have the significant trait of de-
siring as much untenanted land on their borders as possible. 99 
93 B. G. IV, 5. 
94 BeG., VII, 22. "Singulari militum nostrorum virtuti consilia 
cuiusque modi Gallorum occurebant, ut est summae genus sol-
lertiae atque ad omnia imitanda et efficienda, quae ab 
quoque traduntur, aptissimum. H 
95 !!..G., VI, 11-24. 
96 B.G., II, 15. "Nullum aditum esse ad aos mercatoribus: nihil 
pati vinireliquarumque rerum inferri, quod iis rebus relan-
guescere animos ••• et remitti virtutem eXistimarent; esse 
homines feros magnaeque virtutis, increpitare atque incuaare 
reliquos Belgas ••• " 
97 B.G., II, 4. 
98 B.G., 11,15, 27. 
99 BoG., IV, 3. "Publice maximam put ant esse laudem, quam latis-
sime a suis finibus vacare agros: hac re significari , magnum 
numerum civitatumsuam vim sustineri non posse." 
, 
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.' Leaders of particular importance come in for special men-
tion. Caesar, for example, gives a good deal of attention to 
Dumnorix, the Aeduan, who was popular, openhanded, and as ambi-
tious for primacy in the state as was,. the Roman himself .100 
' .... 
Another leading figure is Ariovistus whose speechlOl reveals a 
resolute leader of a proud people, and emphasizes the danger of 
that struggle which forms the subject 0' the second half of the 
first Commentary. No wonder the Romans were signing their wills 
in the camp and weeping uncontrollably before the battle!102 
Of a third hero, Vercingetorix, we need only say that his repu-
tation as the champion of French independence has been won for 
him only through the pages of Caesar. 
There are,too, in addition to these names of greater 
importance, about ninety-three "minor characters" in the Gallic 
Wars. l03 This is a surprisingly large number for a relatively 
100 ~.G., 1,9, l8i V, 6. "Erat una cum ceteris Dumnorix, de quo 
ante ••• dictum est ••• eum cupidum rerum novaruM, cupidum impe- , 
rii, magni animi, magnae ••• auctoritatis ..... 
101 B.Q., 1,36. "neminem secum sine sua pernicie contendisse. 
Cum vellet, congrederetur: intellecturum, quid invicti Ger-
mani, exercitatissimi in armis. qui inter annos XIV tectum 
non subissent, virtute possent." • 
102 ~., 39. "Hi neque vultum fingere neque interdum lacrimas 
tenere poterant: abditi ln tabernaculls aut suum fatum quae-
rebantur aut oum famlllarlbus suls oommune perioulum mlse-
rabantur. Volgo totis castris testamenta obslgnabantur." 
Thls scene, ls one of the most human of the many slmllar 
ones related ln tbe Commentarles. 
103 Edna Klrk, "Mlnor Roles ln Caesar's Drama," Classioal 
Journal, XXX, (1934-5), 339. 
86 
.' 
short work. What is more surprising, many of these characters 
are pictured in a way to be long remembered. We have, for ins-
tance, the general who "had reported to him as seen that which 
he had not seen."104 This gives a h~~ous touch to the narra-
tive and incidentally, shows (without Cae~ar having to draw the 
moral) how uncertain are the fortunes of war, when a trusted 
aide could fail his general by letting 'he imagination play 
tricks on him. Other of these minor figures have been mentioned 
in the preceed1ng chapter as an argument for Caesar's impartia-
l1ty.105 Such care 1n dep1cting those who played both inciden-
! 
tal and prominent parts in the story of his conquest has been, 
we think, a factor contribut1ng greatly to the popularity of 
Caesar's Commentaries. For in them the thoughtful and not too 
~nimaginative reader will find a true-to-life description of a 
real struggle of a dying nation against a ris1ng empire, and 
from that story will be able to find many a parallel for the 
events of subsequent centuries. That is another reason why h1s 
work has surv1ved, while that of most of his predecessors has 
fallen into ob11vion. 
104 B.G. I, 22. "Caesar cognovit •.• Considium, timore perterri-
"tum, quod non vidisset, pro viso sibi renuntiasse." 
105 21. pp. 35-36 above. 
f 
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Because so little of Roman history is extant, it is hard to 
say exactly how far Caesar surpassed his predecess~rs in all the 
various qualities considered above. But, at any rate, his Gallic 
Wars conforms very closely to the nor~established by Cicero in 
the De Oratore. For this literary (as well as military and 
political) genius realized what was needed to make Roman history 
live and wrote accordingly. Consequentfy, when DeWitt says of 
his work, "there is no rhetorical elaboration, no philosophical 
interpretation of events, no dramatic scheme, no evaluation of 
larger historical issues,ul06 he is speaking a truth, but only a 
half-truth. 
We come now to the second division of Cicero's recommenda-
tiona for artistic history. For as a conclusion to his descrip-
tion of the ideal historical composition, he makes a reference 
~ 
to the proper historical style. The reference, despite its bre-
vity, concerns the most important point of all in his eyes. 
Consider the prominence it holds in all his previous criticism 
of the Roman historians, both in the De Oratore, where he treats 
history formally, and in the occasional references to it in the 
remainder of the oratorical works. Thus a general descript10n 
106 DeWitt, "Non-Political Nature ••• " 348. 
f 
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of the historians of Cato's time is Qui sine ullis ornamentis 
monumentasolum temporum, hominum, locorum gestarumque relique-
runt ••• et dum intelligatur quid'dicant, unam dicendi laudem pu-
107 
tant esse brevitatem. According to.fits tastes, ipse etiam 
Piso ••• religuit ••• annales sane exiliter scriptos ••• 108 And af-
ter admitting that Antipater paulum se erexit et addidit maiorem 
• historiae sonum voci, he adds ceteri non exornatores rerum, sed 
tantummodo narratores fuerunt. 109 Moreover, even the power of 
Antipater was sine nitore ac palaestra.110 
Such being the unfortunate reality, what, we ask, was Ci-
cero's ideal historical style? The brief reference in the ~ 
Oratore: 
••• verborum autem ratio et genus orationis 
fusum atque tractatum et cum lenitate qua-
dam aequabiliter profluens sine hac iudi-
cali asperitate et sine sententiarum foren-
sibus aculeis persequendum est.lll 
is clear enough and its precepts are veIl exemplified by Cae-
sar's GalliC Wars. A difficulty presents itself, however, if we , 
107 De Oratore, 11,54. 
108 Brutus, 106. 
109 De Oratore, 11,54. 
110 De Legibus, I, 6. 
111 De Oratore, 11,64. 
• 
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consider two other passages in the Orator where Cicero speaks of 
ornateness as a characteristic of the historical style. In one 
of these passages, after describing the over-ornate style ot the 
Sophists, Cicero adds: 
Ruic generi historia finitima est. In qua et 
narratur ornate et regio saepe aut pugna des-
cribltur; interponuntur etiam contiones et 
hortationes. Sed in his trac~a quaedam et 
fluens expetltur, non haec co~orta et acris 
oratl0. Ab his non multo secus quam a poetls 
haec eloquentia quam quaerimus sevocanda est. 112 
And speaking ln another passage ot the kind ot narrative proper 
to the oration, he says narrationes credlbiles ~ historico sed 
prope cotidiano sermone explicatae dilucide. 113 Now just what 
kind of ornateness this implies it is hard to say. For it is 
distinguished from the ornate style of political oratory as well 
as trom the legalistic style of the courtroom. Our difficulty 
is increased when we find Cicero concluding his praise of Cae- ,. 
saris Commentaries with the statement that nihil est enim in 
historia pura !1 lllustri brevitate dulCius. 114 
There seems to be a contradiction here, but we think that 
the following plausible interpretation will save Cicero's 
112 Orator, 66. 
113 Ibid., 124. 
114 Brutus, 262. 
• 
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consistency. Whenever he speaks of ornamentation as a charac-
teristic of the historical style, he is simply stating an esta-
blished fact. But when it is a question of giving a positive 
recommendation of the style best sui t.eq to historical literature, 
' .. .... 
he either omits mention of the need of ornament (as in the pas-
sage from the De Oratore just quoted) or at least he fails to 
stress it. For ornamentation was not s~ crying a need in Roman 
history as a certain rhythm and cadence and flow of language. 
What Cicero does stress, therefore, is the need of that smooth 
and flowing style which was his own oontribution to Latin ora-
tory and an improvement which he WB-S probably anxious to intro-
duce into Roman history as well. Provided this was obtained, he 
was probably indifferent to the presence or absence of ornamen-
tation. Consider his praise of Caesar1s Commentaries: 
Vald.e, quidem, inquam probandos; nudi enim 
sunt, recti et venusti, omni ornatu oratio-
nie tamquam veste detracta. Sed dum voluit 
alios habere parata, unde sumerent qui vel-
lent scribere historiam, ineptis gratum 
fortasse fecit, qui illa volent calamistris 
inurere, san~s quidem homines a scribendo 
deterruit ••• 15 
How else may we explain his enthusiastic reception of this work 
in the same passage in which he remarks their terseness and bare 
ness, except by saying that they fulfill his essential norm for 
115 Ibid., 207. 
-
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fine historical composition - a smooth and flowing style? How 
often does he insist on this quality? His criticism of the his-
tory of Antipater is neque ••• tractu orationis ~ et aequabili 
perpolivit illud opus. 116 In our chi~t text from the ~ Oratore 
we again have the words genus orationis fusum atque tractum et 
~ lenitate quadam aequabiliter proflu,ns. In the Orator it is 
said of histories in his tracta quaedam et fluens expetitur.117 
Later in the same work this recommendation is more explicitly 
stated !g historia ••• placet omnia dici Isocrateo Theopompeoque 
~ ~ circumscriptione ambituque, ut tamquam in orbe inclusa 
currat oratio, quod insistat in singulis perfectis absolutisque 
sententiis. 118 Undoubtedly, Cicerots main desire was this 
smooth and easy flow. Ornamentation was only incidental. Now 
let us show that this main desire was fulfilled by Caesar in t~ 
Gallic ~. 
Practically all the commentators praise this work for its 
terseness, purity of diction, ~~d freedom from ornamentation. , 
This is not surprising since Caesar was a member of the Atticist 
school - a group which made profession of these literary 
116 De Oratore, II, 54. 
117 OTator, 66. 
118 Ibid., 207. 
• 
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qualities. But it would be wrong to think that the presence of 
these characteristics ~ ipso demands the absence of rhythm. 
Such indeed was the common result in the products of inferior 
workmen of Caesar's own school. Thi~. ~s not true, however, ot 
~~ 
the author we are now considering. There is such a thing as the 
Caesarian period. While it is not, of course, as elaborate as 
that of Livy or of Cicero himself, it wbuld more than satisfy 
the demands of the latter as they are expressed in his rhetori-
cal works. Since there are various ways of attaining smoothness 
of style, Cicero, as a literary critic, would be the last to at-
tempt to cast the diverse geniuses of men into the same mould. 
What, we may ask, were the particular devices of which Caesar 
made use in attaining smoothness in his own style? 
Before answering this question let us first consider the 
nature of Caesar's problem. It is the same as that of every 
writer of historical narrative and is summed up very well for us 
by J.J.Schlicher: -One of the chief problems of historical writ-
ing is how to present the separate events or acts which make up 
a situation in such a way as to present their sequence in time 
and also to show their relations to one another and their ~el­
ative importance.- 119 So, as an advance over -the blunt and 
119 J.J.Schlicher, "The Development of Caesar's Narrative 
Style,· Classical Philology, XXXI, (1936), 212. 
, 
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monotonous sentences of the earlier annalists, "120 prose writers 
in the half century preceding Caesar had added to a "dominant 
verb" various subord1nate clauses or phrases to express the re-
lations of the events contributing t~\pe main aotion. We rea-
lize, then, that Caesar was not starting something new, but was 
oonsoious1y perfeoting a development that had already begun • 
• 
Acoording to Soh1icher "in a total of about 2,530 narratlve 
sentenoes in Caesar we flnd some 2,170 domlnant verbs, eaoh pre-
oeded by one or more phrases or olauses express1ng pre11minary 
or oontemporary events or oiroumstances."121 As a partlcu1ar1y 
skillful example of this practice we mlght examlne one of the 
perlods found ln Book II of the Ga111c Wars. Some Gauls had 
deserted to the Nervl1 from Caesar's camp and had proposed to 
the former a plan of attacklng Caesar's army while on the maroh. 
120 Ibid. 
Adiuvabat etlam eorum consl1ium qui rem defe-
rebant, quod Nervll antlquitus, cum equitatu 
nihil possent (neque enlm ad hoc tempus el 
rei student, sed quioquid possunt, pedestri-
bus valent copils), quo faol1ius finltimorum 
equltatum, si praedandi oausa ad eos venlssent, 
lmpedirent, tenerls arborlbus inolsis atque 
inf1exis crebrlsque in 1atltudinem ramis ena-
tis et rubis sentibusque interieotis effeoe-
rant, ut instar muri hae saepes munimenta 
praeberent quo non modo ~~n intrari, sed ne 
perspioi quidem posset.1 
121 Ibid., 212-213. 
122 B.G., II, 17. 
• 
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In this passage the dominant verb is effeoerant, although it is 
not the main verb grammatioally. What are some of the oontri-
buting oiroumstanoes expressed by the subordinate olauses? Firs 
of all, we are told that the proposal., ~f the deserters was par-
~~ 
tioularly favorable to the Nervii praotioe of ambusoade. Anothe 
olause tells us that the Nervii usually resorted to this method 
beoause of their weakness in oavalry. • short parenthesis oom-
ments on the oontinuanoe of this weakness among the armed foroes 
of that tribe. Quo faoilius ..• impedirent states the purpose of 
the partioular ambush about to be desoribed. The ablative ab-
solute desoribes the oonstruotion of the oamouflage. Quo non 
modo •.• posset states the final effeot of the devioe of the ene-
my. All these faots Caesar has expressed in one sentenoe, made 
up of one substantive, one ooordinate and six subordinate olaus-
es, and one ablative absolute. When translating this sentenoe -
for the Loeb edition of the Gallio ~, H.J.Edwards finds it 
neoessary to use two sentenoes. 
One of the dangers, however, in the use of this struoture 
is that too many subordinate olauses tend to overwork a period 
and thus impede that very smoothness and even flow of word~ 
whioh they are intended to seoure. Caesar, too, was oonsoious 
of this. As the work prooeeds, there is an inorease in the 
substitution of the partioipial oonstruotion. While this served 
the same essential purpose of expressing oontributing 
, 
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.' circumstances, it was more effective in securing Cicero's even 
flow than the more"self-sufficient subordinate clause or even 
the ablative absolute with its own subject and predicate ele-
ments."123 Thus in a later book of )~e Gall~c Wars we have the 
following passage: 
Tandem Germani ab dextro latere summum iugum 
nacti hostes loco depellunt;.fugientes usque 
ad frumen, ubi Vercingetorix cum pedestr1bus 
cOP.iis consederat, persequuntur compluresque 
interficiunt. l24 
where Caesar uses two participles to express circumstances for 
which in the early books he might have employed a subor.dinate 
clause. 
These are the chief means which Caesar uses in securing his 
smoothness of style. Of the use of the coordinating conjunction 
to divide the load of the period there are only two hundred and 
... 
sixty five cases in ~ of Caesar; of the continuing relative 
clauses, one hundred and fifty three cases in the Gallic Wars; 
and of the ~ circumstantial clause only about a dozen examples 
in each of his two works. 125 But in view of his mastery of the 
periodic sentence, the substitution of participles for 
123 Schlicher, 219. 
124 B.G., VII, 67. 
125 Again Schlicher is my authority for these figures, 219-21. 
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subordinate olauses, the frequent use of the ablative absolutel2 
and at least the realization of the usefulness of other devices, 
we may say that Caesar not only showed signs of the progress of 
Latin historioal style, but marked such an attainment in this 
.~ 
lirie, that his work today is considered worthy of serving as a 
model for the young student of Latin in acquiring a command of 
a clear, elegant, and smooth prose stylt. 
• 
126 A frequent use of the ablative absolute in Caesar is after 
the dominant verb. Tacitus frequently uses this devioe. 
, 
CHAPTER V 
THE FIRST ROMAN LITERARY HISTORY 
Now that we have concluded test~.ng the Gallic Wars accor-
....... 
ding to the norms of Ciceronian criticism, we are prepared to 
state openly that which we only hinted at in the first chapter 
of this thesis. It is that this work dr Caesar constitutes the 
first Roman literary history. A brief review of the steps lead-
ing to this conclusion will be helpful. We began the discussion 
by notlng that progress ln Roman historiography by the middle of 
the first century B.C. did not correspond with the developments 
ln other literary fields, The brief review of Roman history 
which was contained in the second chapter showed that this neg-
lect was due to both scientific and artistic neglect. We could, 
then, understand Cicero's discouragement and his reasons for -
proposing an ideal for historlcal oomposition. Our third ohap-
ter analyzed this ideal whioh demanded both artistio and scien-
tiflc lmprovements, with more emphasls, however, on the former. f 
Acoordingly, the fourth chapter considered the credibllity of 
the Gallio Wars and decided that the more probable oonolusion 
• 
is that it constitutes a falr and aoourate aocount of a great 
Roman military venture. Next, the fifth chapter revealed that 
by a close (but probably unconscious) observance of Ciceronian 
norms for an effective presentation, Caesar had produced an 
98 . 
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artistic history. Now then, unless we are prepared to say that 
these norms of Cicero do not form a worthy literary ideal, it 
follows that Caesar has been the first of the Romans to write 
a real history. 
These norms, as has been said, do not present the highest 
literary ideal. Yet as the Gallic Wars proves, their observance 
--, 
would do much to remedy the unreliability and baldness of all 
the previous Roman attempts and would result in a production apt 
to attract more than the professional scholar. It is, there-
fore, no argument against this thesis to say that Sallust was a 
more artistic historian than Caesar. We did not state that Cae-
sar was the most artistic historian among the Romans but rather 
the first artistic historian, because his work preceded the 
Bellum Catilinae and the Bellum Jugurthinum by at least ten 
,.. 
years. Moreover, though we readily concede the palm to Sallust 
for his artistic merits, the opinion of his reliability is not 
at all as certain as it is in the case of Caesar. In the words 
of J.C.Rolfe~ 
Nevertheless, judged by modern standards, the 
Jugurtha is rather like an historical novel 
of the better oaass than like sober history. 
Chronology is to a great extent disregarded, 
and in place of exact dates we have such vague 
expressions as "interea," "iisdem temporibus," 
Ilpaucos post annos," and the like. Sallust 
even ventures upon shifts in the sequence of 
events, in order to make a better rounded tale. 
As ~ literary masterpiece the work takes 
high ~.I 
.' 
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But we insist that accuracy is the more essential"requirement in 
this branch of literature. 2 Therefore, since the work of Caesar 
meets the demands of both science an~~art, it conforms more per-
fectly to the norms of Cicero and, in fact, to all sensible es-
timation of historical worth. It is t~e first credible and 
artistic Roman history. 
One difficulty remains. We said in the introductory chap-
ter that we would not consider it a refutation of our position 
if Cicero failed to mention explicitly that the Commentaries 
were an answer to his hopes. Our reason for stating thiS, 
though only a conjecture, is very conformable to Cicero's cha-
racter. The De Oratore in which he recalled the deficiencies of 
Roman history-writing and in which he established his own norms 
for the improvement of that branch, was published in 55. The 
6allic Wars which conform closely to those norms was published 
about five years later. But in that part of the Brutus (written' 
in 46) where Cicero enthusiastically praises Caesar's work, he 
• 
1 Sallust, Bellum Catilinae and Bellum Iugurthinum, edt and 
transl. by J.C.Rolfe, Putnam's, New York, 1929, xv. 
(Italics mine). 
2 It is true that the modern trend is to give Sallust more cre-
dit for accuracy and objectivity than was formerly the case • 
.Qf. T.R.Broughton, "Was Sallust Fair to Cicero?".!m, ' 
LXVII, (1936), 35. 
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fails to state that at last Roman history had met his requirements 
and definitely entered this field of literature. In view of his 
dejection at the poor performance of past historians, we would 
expect him to be only too glad to ma,e~this admission. This is 
our explanation of the omission. When Cicero established his 
norms in 55, he could not know that Caesar was to be the first 
Roman to conform to them. Now althougt Caesar was a friend of 
Cicero he was not only a literary rival but a member of the famous 
Atticists, a school diametrically opposed to Cicero's own teach-
ings. That the only really worth-while representative of that 
school had produced a fine example of terse and elegant expression 
Cicero could not fail to recognize. Nor will anyone deny that he 
outdid himself in praising his rival's success. But perhaps he 
thought it beyond the bounds of strict justice or the rquirements 
of courteous rivalry to go any further. In other words he wou!d 
not explicitly admit that the norms which he had set down in 55 
were first applied with success by a member of an opposing school. 
From the generous praise bestowed upon the author let others draw 
the very probable conclusion of his own mind which he felt under 
no oblfgation to express himself. 
.' 
Now this is just what we have done in the thesis. We have 
made the inference which Cicero would not, we think, deny. And 
that inference is, we repeat, that the Commentaries ~ !a! Gallic 
!!£! not only mark a literary advance but in themselves comprise 
101 
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a masterpiece. It is, then, not a sentimental custom that has 
inflicted this work on the resisting schoolboy, ~ut the well-
founded opinion of students of Latin that with this work, 
..• we seem to see the trao~ormation of a striot-
ly professional account of warfare in which only 
the army and its aohievements in the mass and the 
general's strategy were important, into something 
like history.:3 
•• 
:3 Schlicher, 224. 
-
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